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ABSTRACT
The current research provides an examination of felony murder to determine the
similarities and differences among jurisdictions in the nation. It provides a current analysis of
jurisprudence to update the literature as to practices in the United States pertaining to the
availability of felony murder and the specific elements that make up the rule.
This research conducts a survey of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the
Federal System. It provides an overview of the felony-murder rule and its availability, the
degrees to which the doctrine is utilized, and the subsequent sentences allowable for
defendants convicted under the theory. Current statutes are analyzed to establish what
circumstances specifically constitute felony murder and the criteria required by each of the
jurisdictions. Additionally, it determines to what degree jurisdictions subscribe to the felonymurder theory, which ones allow individuals to be eligible for life sentences or death
sentences, and which jurisdictions allow the rule to be applied to non-triggerman offenders.
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INTRODUCTION
The current research conducts a survey of the states that utilize the felony-murder
rule and to what degree. Although there have been several studies about the application of
this controversial rule, it has been many years since the discussion has taken place. This
study poses questions about equity and fairness in the availability of the of the felony-murder
rule. The main purpose is to update the literature regarding what constitutes felony murder.
Another goal is for this research to be thought provoking and assist the reader in answering
moral and ethical questions about equality, fairness, and justice.
This work explains what defines felony murder, the required culpability of offenders
charged under the theory, proportionality in sentencing, along with why the criminal justice
system, and ultimately society, punishes people. In addition, a detailed analysis of state
statutes explains what establishes felony murder by revealing the underlying felonies and the
criteria for felony murder among the jurisdictions. The statutes further define degrees and
sentences and provide a comparison with other varying degrees of murder. One of the
research questions is that the felony-murder rule is available at the highest degree in most
jurisdictions in the United States. This study also proposes that a death sentence is available
for felony murder in a large majority of jurisdictions that utilize the death penalty.
Additionally, A non-triggerman can be convicted of felony murder and eligible for a death
sentence in jurisdictions that provide for the death penalty.
It is anticipated that this research will enable the reader to form opinions about the
felony-murder rule and its availability; the degree to which it is used, along with the types of
sentences that are proportionate and equitable for defendants convicted under the theory
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compared to deliberate and purposeful killings. Questions posed are: Should defendants be
responsible for results that are not their intention? And, how much more severe should a
defendant’s sentence for felony murder be compared to a defendant convicted of an
unadulterated, premeditated killing?
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FELONY MURDER DEFINED
Felony murder is based on the theory that if a person commits a certain violent
crime and an unintentional death is the result of that crime such person should be
responsible for the death(s) that occur. The rule is based on the idea of transferred intent;
where intent to commit a violent crime, often referred to as the underlying or qualifying
felony, is transferred to actually intend that a killing take place. In its simplest form, the
courts permit the intent to commit an underlying felony to become the intent to kill. The
acknowledged intent to commit a predetermined, qualifying violent felony is essentially
substituted for the absent intent to kill. Through a bootstrapping of inference, a nonintentional killing is transformed into a premeditated murder.
The felony-murder rule allows for a first-degree murder conviction when an
individual commits a violent felony that directly results in the death of another person. The
death of the victim can be completely accidental as long as the underlying felony was
intentional (Tuite, 2003b). Logically it follows that there is no difference between the intent
to commit robbery and the intent to kill.
Consider the following scenarios:
!

Randy and Michael cross paths on a street corner and begin arguing with
each other. Michael starts threatening Randy. In turn, Randy is in fear for his
safety because Michael is a much larger guy and he has somewhat of a
reputation around town. Randy begins to pull out a pistol from the waist belt
of his pants. Randy’s intent is to merely scare Michael off; however, seeing
the pistol Michael grabs Randy’s hand and they wrestle to the ground. The
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gun discharges killing Michael. Under this scenario, Randy may or may not
(depending on a jury’s finding) be guilty of some degree of homicide. It may
be manslaughter or third-degree murder if a jury determines that Randy is
culpably negligent. It may even constitute second-degree murder if the jury
finds that Randy’s actions exhibited the requisite “imminently dangerous act
evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any
premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual” (Fla
Statutes § 782.04 (2)). Alternatively, the jury may acquit Randy; finding the
homicide to be accidental or excusable under the theory of self-defense.
What this scenario does not illustrate is first-degree murder because Randy
never had a premeditated intent to kill, as defined in Florida Statutes, “the
unlawful killing of another human being when perpetrated from a
premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any human
being” (§ 782.04 (1) (a) 1). Adding an underlying felony to this same scenario
greatly changes the consequences.
!

Randy and Michael cross paths on a street corner. Randy pulls out a pistol
and robs Michael taking his wallet. Michael then grabs Randy’s hand with the
gun in it and a struggle ensues. The gun discharges killing Michael. In this
scenario, Randy is now guilty of armed robbery, which is punishable by life
imprisonment in many states, as well as first-degree felony murder;
punishable by life imprisonment or death in most states that utilize the death
penalty.
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Under the second scenario, the killing itself is factually identical to the one in the first
scenario—an accidental gun discharge during a scuffle. However, now Randy faces the death
penalty (at least in the states that have the death penalty) because of the underlying felony.
Although in the second scenario there is criminal intent due to the robbery, the question is
the severity of punishment available in both situations.
Another scenario exists when there is a case involving multiple defendants. Many
jurisdictions provide accomplice language in their felony murder statutes, which mainly state
that any person committing the underlying felony is guilty of first-degree murder whenever
any one of the felons commits a killing. 1
This is in keeping with the “law of principals” doctrine, which holds that during the
course of a crime any and all defendants are legally and equally responsible for all the actions
of their codefendants. For example, if Randy and Michael enter a store to rob it and Randy
starts emptying the cash register while Michael holds the clerk at gunpoint and Michael
shoots the clerk (whether intentionally or accidentally), Randy is just as guilty of murder as
Michael and equally culpable under the law. Under this scenario, assuming for argument’s
sake that the shooting by Michael was accidental, there is a situation where a non-triggerman
is guilty of a non-premeditated murder and is, consequently, guilty of first-degree felony
murder and in many states can legally be sentenced to death (William Van Poyck, personal
phone conversation, February 10, 2005).

1

See States that Allow Conviction for a Non-Triggerman section.
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The main purpose of this antiquated ideology is to deter felonies that put human life
at risk. A felony is considered inherently dangerous to human life when it cannot be
committed without creating a substantial risk that someone will be killed (George, 2004).
The central idea behind the felony-murder rule is that if a person participates in a dangerous
act (mainly a felony in most cases) for which he does not intentionally take a life, but a life is
lost as the result and the offender commits the act with “extreme indifference to the value of
human life” he should be responsible for the death as if he intended the death to happen
(Whitmire, 2003). Felony murder proponents believe that the underlying felony is the only
unlawful act required. Whether the death that resulted is accidental or unintentional is of no
significance.
Essentially, the rule focuses on the culpability in committing the felony itself.
However, it contradicts the criminal law (Myers, 1997) in that people are independent actors
who have the capacity to make choices and the knowledge and ability to do what is lawful
and right. Although there has been a trend in the United States to restrict the felony-murder
rule (Fortado, 2004), use of the rule has also broadened in scope and is being used more
frequently in instances where second-degree murder or manslaughter may be more
appropriate.
A Brief History
English courts first utilized the felony-murder rule in 1536. Some years later when
malice aforethought was the requisite for murder, and later when criminal homicide defined
manslaughter, a wrongdoing was the premise to infer malice aforethought. During that time,
a general malevolence was inherent in a voluntary wrongdoing. Some courts in the 1600s
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retained the original definition, however, many of them incorporated premeditation and a
specific mental culpability into the construct of malice aforethought (Gilbert, 1983).
At common law all felonies were punishable by death. In a felony-murder situation,
it made little difference whether the individual was convicted of murder or of the underlying
felony because the punishment was the same. The main purpose for the felony-murder rule
at common law was to deal with a killing that occurred during a failed attempt at a felony.
Because attempts were punished as misdemeanors, the use of the felony-murder rule allowed
the courts to punish the offender in the same manner as if his attempt had succeeded.
Consequently, a conviction for attempted robbery was a misdemeanor, but a homicide
committed in the attempt was murder and punishable by death. 2 After much criticism from
the courts in England due to harsh punishments, Parliament abolished the felony-murder
rule in 1957 (Gilbert, 1983).
Drafters of the Model Penal Code in the United States believed that a specific guilty
mental state was a necessary and essential requirement for murder under the principles of
the criminal law and, therefore, would have abolished the felony-murder rule altogether.
However, as a compromise and to appease conservative legislatures the language “under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” while
committing certain dangerous felonies was incorporated and allowable under the felonymurder rule. In the Model Penal Code, extreme indifference is sufficient to establish murder
and the presumption exists with the commission of certain enumerated felonies.

2

For a more detailed explanation, see People v. Aaron, 1980.
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Most state jurisdictions have not adopted the Model Penal Code’s version, as they
only require that the offender commit one of the state’s qualifying felonies (Adlerstein,
1976). However, a few come close by requiring a specific mental state in order to be
convicted for the highest degree of murder.
Historians and commentators have concluded that the felony-murder rule is of
questionable origin and that the reasons for the doctrine no longer exist, making it an
anachronistic remnant for which there is no logical or practical basis in modern law. Felony
murder has never been a static, well-defined doctrine at common law, but throughout its
history it has been characterized by judicial reinterpretation to limit the harshness of its
application (People v. Aaron, 1980).
Felony Murder Typology
Following is a typology of the felony-murder rule among jurisdictions in the United
States. It reveals how felony murder is currently identified and how it is defined in various
statutes. All of the jurisdictions that subscribe to the theory statutorily define what degree
felony murder can be applied. Among the jurisdictions, there are several categories in which
the rule is identified (See Appendix A for a full breakdown).
A few jurisdictions have abolished the rule altogether, a few provide a separate
felony murder statute to address the issue, and some of the jurisdictions exclusively define
the rule in their second-degree murder or murder statutes. A majority, however, provide for
felony murder in multiple statutes: capital or first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and
third-degree murder or some form of manslaughter.
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Currently there are three states that do not subscribe to the felony murder theory
and have abolished the rule. Both Hawaii and Kentucky eradicated the practice by statute
(Gilbert, 1983) and Michigan no longer uses the rule by abrogating it through case law (See
People v. Aaron, 1980).
Three states contain separate felony murder statutes: Connecticut, Maine, and
Wisconsin. Both Connecticut and Maine primarily provide the same statutory language:
A person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more
persons, he commits or attempts to commit [list of qualifying felonies], and
in the course or in furtherance of such crime or of flight therefrom, he, or
another participant, if any, causes the death of a person.
Conn Penal Code Chap 952 § 53a-54c
There are a few differences, however. For instance, Maine allows for an additional
requirement in that the resulting death must be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the crime
(Crim Code Title 17-A Chap 9 §202, 1), while Connecticut adds that the person killed must
be someone other than one of the participants (Penal Code § 53a-54c).
The state of Wisconsin approaches felony murder differently than all other
jurisdictions by offering a determinant sentence of an additional fifteen years in excess of the
maximum sentence for the felony committed or attempted (Crim Code § 940.03). 3
Alaska, Missouri, and Pennsylvania exclusively allow for felony murder in their
second-degree murder statutes. These states categorize felony murder with some

3

See Appendix B for each jurisdiction’s list of qualifying felonies.
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differences, but with the same primary purpose of allowing for a lesser sentence for the
crime of felony murder.
For example, both Alaska and Pennsylvania allow for a conviction if the defendant
was “engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.” Alaska and
Missouri include that a defendant is eligible under the rule if he “commits or attempts to
commit [an underlying felony]” or if the offender is in immediate flight from the crime.
Nevertheless, the sentence allowable is specifically for murder in the second degree in all
three states.4
Several states provide exclusively for murder (or aggravated murder) without
varying degrees.5 In such instances, the states provide for felony murder within their
murder and/or manslaughter statutes.
If a jurisdiction defines felony murder in their first-degree murder or capital
murder statute, it is very similar to Arizona’s first-degree murder language, which states in
part:
A person commits first-degree murder if acting either alone or with one or
more other persons the person commits or attempts to commit [qualifying
felonies offered] and in the course of and in furtherance of the offense or
immediate flight from the offense, the person or another person causes the
death of any person.
ARS § 13-1105, A, 2

AS § 11.41.110 (a) (3), Missouri Revised Statutes § 565.021(2), Penn Crime Codes § 2502 (b)
See Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah.
And, Montana approaches it a little differently by identifying felony murder as deliberate homicide.
4

5
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There are a few substantive differences, however, among the states that provide for
felony murder in the highest degree. The statutory language varies in three notable areas:
1) Accomplice language6
2) The qualifying felonies allowable for felony murder7
3) Situational circumstances of the offense8
Several states statutorily identify and provide for felony murder as capital or
aggravated murder9; however, most of them provide for lesser degrees of felony murder as
well.
In addition, it is worth noting that seven of the death penalty states that identify
felony murder in their first-degree murder or capital murder statutes require a specific mens
rea, or guilty mind, for a conviction under the theory of felony murder. However, all but one
of the states in this category allow for a death sentence (See Table 4 and Appendix C).
Sentences for felony murder in most of the death penalty states allow defendants to
be death eligible upon conviction absent any culpable mental state.10
Along with first-degree murder, many of the states identify felony murder in
multiple degrees, including second-degree murder, third-degree murder, or manslaughter.
Other than the states that include first-degree murder as a lesser degree of felony
murder, specifically capital murder states, the underlying crime is not enumerated in a
majority of the lesser-degree statutes. As an example, several of the states that allow for
See States that Allow Conviction for a Non-Triggerman section.
See Appendix B, and Additional, Atypical Qualifying Felonies (Table 2).
8 See Appendix C for a comprehensive breakdown by jurisdiction.
9 See Arkansas, Mississippi, Ohio, Utah, and Virginia.
10 See The Death Penalty: An Option for Felony Murder section.
6
7
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lesser degrees of felony murder, including both second-degree murder and manslaughter,
allow for a conviction if a person “unintentionally causes the death of another person during
the commission of an unlawful act other than a forcible felony,”11 while other states
delineate specific felonies and/or degrees of felonies that qualify for a lesser degree of
murder.12
Some of the states also discriminate between first and second-degree felony murder
by the culpable mental state of the offender.13 Several, however, distinguish lesser degrees of
felony murder by requiring that a defendant be engaged in any felony other than the
enumerated felonies in the state’s first degree or capital murder statutes.14
Figure 1 below illustrates and categorizes the different types of the felony-murder
rule available among the states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal System. It also
illustrates how jurisdictions in the United States identify felony murder in various statutes.
There are three states that have abolished the rule altogether. The felony murder category
reveals that three states identify felony murder distinct and separate from other murder
statutes, 2nd dg only shows that three jurisdictions exclusively provide for felony murder in
their second-degree murder statutes, deliberate homicide and murder reflects that 12 states
do not allow for varying degrees of murder (although most offer some form of
manslaughter). Capital/1st dg denotes that 32 jurisdictions provide for felony murder in a
first-degree or capital murder statute. And of those, 21 provide for felony murder in multiple
degrees of murder.

See generally, Crim Code of Georgia § 16-5-3, Iowa Code § 707.5, Miss Code § 97-3-29, Nebraska Crim Code §
28-305, NM Statutes Annotated § 30-2-3, B, Ohio Revised Code § 2903.04 (B), Penal Code of Oklahoma § 21701.8.2
12 IC § 35-42-1-4, Minn Crim Code § 609.19, 1 (2), NY Penal Law § 125.25, 3, NC General Statutes Article 6 §
14-17, Tenn Code § 39-13-210 (a) (2)
13 Del Crim Code Title 11 § 635 (2), NH Crim Code § 630:1-b (b), Penal Code of Okla § 21-701.8.2)
Additionally, Florida differentiates second-degree murder differently by determining whether the killing was the
result of a person not engaged in one of the qualifying felonies (§ 782.04 (3).
14 Fla Statutes § 782.04 (4), LA RS § 14:31 A (2) (a), Miss Code §97-3-27, SD Codified Laws § 22-16-9, Code of
Virginia § 18.2-33)
11
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35

Number of Jurisdictions

30
Abolished
25

Felony Murder

20

2nd Dg Only
Deliberate

15

Murder

10

Capital/1st Dg
Multiple Dg

5
0
Identifying Category

Figure 1
Identification of Felony Murder in the U.S.
Note: Many of the jurisdictions have overlapping categories and, therefore, the number of degrees will not
equal the total number of jurisdictions that subscribe to the theory.
In summary, a large majority of the jurisdictions (88 percent) that subscribe to the
theory of felony murder identify it in the highest degree: capital murder, first-degree murder,
or murder. Among those jurisdictions more than half (56 percent) also provide for lesser
degrees of murder, i.e., manslaughter.15 The other 12-percent allow for lesser degrees such
as, second-degree murder, third-degree murder, or manslaughter. In addition, many offer
various culpability situations and circumstances to be eligible for felony murder (See
Appendix C).

15

See Appendix A for a full breakdown of degrees by jurisdiction.
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A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This research provides a review of the literature and discusses viewpoints and the
ideology of felony murder, culpability of offenders who commit felony murder compared to
those who commit other killings, along with deterrence and community sentiment as it
relates to felony murder and the death penalty. It concludes with a discussion about the
availability and the criteria for felony murder over 20 years ago.
In previous discussions about degrees of murder as they apply to the felony-murder
rule, the literature reveals that multiple degrees continue to exist. However, a majority of the
jurisdictions retain and allow for felony murder in the first degree. Even though there has
been lengthy discussion among scholars about the erroneous deterrent effect relating to the
application of the felony-murder rule, it remains the most common form of murder
convictions in the nation (Peterson and Bailey, 1991; Myers, 1994; Myers, 1997), and the
availability of the rule continues to increase. Reviewing degrees of felony murder among the
states (Gilbert, 1983) and the prevalence of the rule in the nation, many courts assert that the
felony-murder rule and its possible deterrent effect establishes sufficient justification for
retaining the rule. Requiring offenders to be accountable for dangerous acts and subsequent
killings, even if they are accidental, is reason enough to apply the felony-murder rule.
Conversely, other courts and scholars believe that it is not possible to deter offenders if a
killing was accidental and, therefore, unintentional and that the states should abolish the rule
(Fletcher, 1980).
In considering the theory of felony murder, there are mainly two schools of thought.
Proponents of the felony-murder rule, predominantly criminal justice officials, believe that if
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a person participates in certain criminal behavior that is so dangerous and in itself likely to
cause harm, then that individual is choosing to be involved in bad acts and, therefore, should
be responsible for whatever result occurs. The other side of the argument, mainly scholars
and defense counsel, believe that an individual should possess specific culpability in terms of
intending or choosing that such bad acts, and resulting consequence, take place (Myers,
1994; Myers, 1997). Critics of the rule further contend that murder is particularly
blameworthy because it is accompanied by an extremely high mental state and that felonymurder killings are not comparable. The intent to commit a felony, such as robbery or
burglary, is not equivalent to the mental culpability required for a conviction of murder
(Fletcher, 1980). The issue of blameworthiness and intent for a resulting death is clearly the
argument that receives the most attention and discussion.
To further understand the issue of culpability and felony murder, Myers (1997)
conducted one of the few empirical research studies about the culpability of offenders for
both felony-murder killings and other types of killings, hypothesizing that both groups
would be similar in circumstances. In comparing the two groups, using variables such as
personal commission of the fatal act, planning of the killing, use of a weapon, and levels of
culpability, Myers found a lack of support for the null hypothesis. It was contradicted when
she found that defendants who were prosecuted under the felony-murder rule were less
likely to have committed the fatal act than those in the non-felony-murder killing group. The
common response to an offender not committing the actual killing, nor intending to do so,
and holding him accountable is that the defendant’s knowing participation in a dangerous
felony is transformed into the malice aforethought and required mental culpability for
murder (Fletcher, 1980). It is probable for a felon to be held liable for a resulting death as if
15

he intended the death to occur (Simmons, 1997) even if there is no proof of intent or of any
culpability as to the resulting death.
In attempting to determine societal views for felony murder and the death penalty,
the U.S. Supreme Court has reached tenuous conclusions about where community sentiment
lies in both Enmund v. Florida (1982) and then Tison v. Arizona (1987). In conducting a survey
of the states that would allow for a death sentence under such circumstances, the Justices on
both sides of the argument in both cases had issues with each other’s methodology. In short,
there has been much discussion about the analysis and the resulting outcome in determining
the “evolving standards of decency” on this issue (Finkel and Duff, 1991).
Societal views and community sentiment for felony murder as they relate to felony
murder and the death penalty have been dubious at best (See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 1987;
Finkel and Duff, 1991; Peterson and Bailey, 1991). A sophisticated, empirical study to gauge
societal views on this issue revealed a lack of support for a death sentence for a defendant
who displays reckless indifference, as the Tison brothers did, without being the actual
triggerman (Finkel and Duff, 1991). This is in sharp contrast to what the majority asserted in
their analysis in the Tison decision in that community sentiment supported a death sentence
under such circumstances. In fact, the dissent in Tison stressed several of the same factors as
Finkel and Duff’s empirical “ninth Justice” paradigm did where the participants in the study
could “reverse and remand” or “let the decision [for a death sentence] stand.”
Additionally, prior research has offered a consistent lack of support for the
deterrence hypothesis as it pertains to the death penalty due to variable data quality issues,
such as using homicide data not specific to capital homicides. For this reason, Peterson and
Bailey conducted research testing felony murder and capital punishment, and the deterrence
16

hypothesis exclusively using capital homicide data. In doing so, they used a time-series
design and analyzed monthly felony murder rates, the frequency of executions, and the
amount of time and type of television coverage of executions over the same period. After
analyzing coverage from three major network stations, the different types of felony murder,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation crime data, they concluded that there was no
evidence of deterrence or brutalization (where the number of killings increases temporarily
immediately following an execution). Specifically, the availability of capital punishment, the
number of executions, the amount of television coverage or the type of coverage given to
the executions was not positively associated with felony murder rates (Peterson and Bailey,
1991). In other words, they found that there was no deterrent effect of felony murder from
publicizing that executions were taking place.
In a rare, empirical study about felony murder and societal views, Finkel and Duff
(1991) conducted two experiments to test community sentiment in using the death penalty in
various felony murder situations. Using a mock juror paradigm and the “ninth Justice”
paradigm, the study revealed that society would reverse and remand a death sentence in
varying degrees depending upon the involvement and culpability of the defendant. The nontriggerman category was the largest in choosing to reverse a death sentence. More
importantly, the result was the same in a triggerman situation.
Peterson and Bailey (1991) point out that their findings are consistent with the
majority of studies that have been conducted on capital punishment and general homicides.
This is not a big surprise because using the death penalty as a general deterrent is suspect in
itself. Therefore, using the same punishment as a specific deterrent for felony murder the
result should not be much different. The authors agree that caution should be used in
17

interpreting their results due to the small number of executions that took place during the
study period, along with a low percentage of executions that received television coverage.
In considering the availability and degrees of the felony-murder rule today, it is
necessary to review past availability and degrees of the rule. There have been a couple of
previous studies (Gilbert, 1983; Fletcher, 1980; Adlerstein, 1976) that provide discussion
about the various degrees of felony murder and its utilization among jurisdictions. Fletcher
(1980) and Adlerstein (1976) mainly focus on various state versions of the felony-murder
rule and lack of congruence in their application and utilization of the rule to the Model Penal
Code’s version.
A comprehensive analysis of the jurisdictions in the United States and the degrees of
murder available under the felony-murder rule has not taken place since Gilbert’s study in
1983. Furthermore, Gilbert mainly focused on degrees of murder and the availability of such
degrees as they applied to the felony-murder rule and not what constitutes or establishes
felony murder among the states, specifically, which felonies and circumstances qualify under
the theory of felony murder. The last review and discussion about the criteria for felony
murder in the United States has not taken place in almost 30 years (Adlerstein, 1976).
When Adlerstein’s study was conducted, a large number of jurisdictions contained
many of the same core felonies that qualify under the felony-murder rule today. In addition,
many of the atypical felonies that were included in various state statutes in 1976 remain on
the books today. However, the number of underlying felonies that qualify for first-degree,
premeditated murder has more than doubled with additions to most of the felony-murder
statutes since that time.
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Almost 30 years ago, Adlerstein (1976) suggested that states should consider
conviction of the underlying felony committed and manslaughter collectively when an
offender acts with reckless disregard for human life. Today, in 2005, in an attempt to
conduct and maintain a fair and equitable criminal justice system, this study suggests the
same approach.
The current research updates and informs the literature to provide criminal justice
professionals and scholars with current data about the felony-murder rule. The hope is that
this study will be useful in facilitating decision-making efforts including charging, convicting,
and sentencing as they relate to the availability and application of the felony murder-rule.
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WHAT ESTABLISHES FELONY MURDER?
The felony-murder rule is primarily utilized as a deterrent for people who would
potentially commit a violent felony. The idea behind the theory is to lessen the potential for
death to occur in the course of such felonies. In general, if an individual is engaged in a
prescribed forcible felony and a person dies as a result of that felony, he is criminally
responsible for the death of such person. The underlying assumption in the deterrent-effect
logic is that the criminal justice system is dealing with rational individuals, which is a
fundamental flaw inherent in the deterrent ideology and one that is seldom addressed or
mentioned in the literature. In order for deterrent theory to be effective, rational individuals
must be part of the equation. It is the opinion of this research that most of the time, the
criminal justice system is not dealing with people who think rationally.
Criteria for Felony Murder
The states that utilize the felony-murder rule statutorily define which forcible
felonies they consider as qualifying, or underlying, felonies. The main characteristic the
felonies have in common is that they must be dangerous or violent in nature. Jurisdictions
also vary somewhat in their view of the required culpability of an offender, along with
situational circumstances of the crime.
The underlying felonies that qualify a person for first-degree felony murder have
increased over time by providing for a myriad of crimes that meet the criteria. Those times
when mainly the index crimes from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report qualified for a firstdegree felony murder conviction have long passed. The crimes that are used as predicate
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felonies for felony murder include a multitude of felonies along with most of the main index
crimes.
An analysis was conducted to determine the criteria for felony murder among the
states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal system and focuses exclusively on the
highest degree of felony murder in each jurisdiction. If a killing takes place while committing
or attempting to commit such a felony, the felony-murder rule typically applies. However,
there are several jurisdictions that require a specific mental state in order to qualify for the
highest degree of felony murder (See Appendix C and Figure 2 this section).
Appendix B, Criteria for Felony Murder, provides a breakdown of the core felonies
utilized by each of the jurisdictions. Note that some of the qualifying felonies the states offer
have the same core meaning (only a different label) and, therefore, have been combined for
simplicity purposes. Felonies that are eligible for lesser degrees of murder have been omitted
from the analysis. Several types of felonies are the same by definition, but they qualify at a
lower degree to facilitate a conviction and sentence of a lesser degree of murder. Of course,
the jurisdictions that do not subscribe to the felony-murder rule have been excluded from
the analysis.
Table 1 provides a breakdown in percentages of the core qualifying felonies and the
prevalence of their usage within the forty-nine jurisdictions that utilize the felony-murder
rule. Currently there is a total of 31 core felonies used to increase the offense of committing
a dangerous felony to felony murder when a resulting death occurs in the course of such
felony. The following list does not include the additional, atypical felonies that several of the
jurisdictions allow (See Table 2 this section). There is a total of 20 atypical felonies; bringing
the total potential felonies available to 51.
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Table 1
Felony Murder Elements and Percentages
Core Qualifying Felonies
Burglary
Robbery
Arson
Kidnapping
Escape
Rape
Sexual Assault
Child Abuse/Cruelty to Children
Controlled Substance Felony
Sexual Offenses with a Child
Terrorism
Other Sexual Offenses
Bomb or Destructive Device (throwing, placing, or discharging)
Carjacking
Sodomy
Drive-by Shooting/Into Building or Vehicle
Felony (forcible/with threat or dangerous weapon)
Aircraft/Vehicle Piracy
Drug Trafficking
Felony (any type)
Mayhem
Resisting Arrest
Treason
Forcible Rape
Home-Invasion Robbery
Larceny or Theft
Murder of Another Human Being
Aggravated Assault
Elder/Disabled Adult Abuse
Felony other than Second Degree Murder/Manslaughter
Crime Punishable by Death or Life

Total # Percent
40
82%
40
82%
39
80%
37
76%
25
51%
20
41%
20
41%
15
31%
12
24%
12
24%
10
20%
9
18%
6
12%
6
12%
6
12%
5
10%
5
10%
4
8%
4
8%
4
8%
4
8%
4
8%
4
8%
3
6%
3
6%
3
6%
3
6%
2
4%
2
4%
2
4%
1
2%

Total Core Qualifying Felonies: 31

The above percentages are understated and lower than each felony’s actual usage due
to the jurisdictions that allow for any felony or any dangerous felony, for which most if not all of
the identified felonies analyzed would qualify. The number of felonies available to charge a
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defendant with felony murder in the United States has increased over the years, and it is
anticipated that this trend will continue.
In comparing Adlerstein’s study and the criteria for felony murder in 1976, several
differences and similarities were revealed. For example, the number of felonies available that
qualify for felony murder has more than doubled. In addition, usage of several of the main
index crimes, specifically arson, burglary, kidnapping, and robbery is essentially the same in
2005 as it was almost 30 years ago. Conversely, rape has gone down considerably since 1976.
This is probably due to the availability of sexual assault rising and, therefore, including the
more serious offense of rape.
Sexual offenses with a child is identified almost triple the amount it was in 1976. In
addition, the controlled substance felony was essentially non-existent 30 years ago, where
now it is present in 24-percent of the states that subscribe to the theory of felony murder.
The felony terrorism did not exist in 1976 whereas about 20-percent of the jurisdictions
define it in their felony murder statutes today. Escape was utilized nominally with about 10
of the jurisdictions allowing for such felony to qualify. Currently, there are 25 jurisdictions
utilizing escape in their felony-murder statutes. Furthermore, there are several felonies
identified today that were not identified at all in 1976: drug trafficking, child abuse/cruelty to
children, murder of another human being, carjacking, various additional types of robberies,
drive-by shootings and gang felonies, elder abuse, child abuse/cruelty to children, treason,
espionage, and sabotage.
As the nation has evolved, time has also changed the way Americans, and
subsequently state legislatures, view how crime can best be assuaged. When considering past
attacks on America, and increased abusive treatment of children, it is understandable that
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legislatures would amend laws to include such crimes as terrorism, espionage, and
abuse/cruelty to children to their felony murder statutes.
In most states, for an underlying felony to upgrade an offense to first-degree murder
the felony must be either a first or second-degree dangerous felony. Many states, however,
provide for varying degrees of qualifying felonies in their highest degree of murder. For
instance, Alabama allows for robbery in any degree, but requires arson, escape, kidnapping,
rape, and sodomy to be in the first degree. Burglary can be committed in either the first or
second degree in several states.16 Maryland also allows third degree burglary to qualify (Crim
Law § 2-201 (a) (4) (iii)). Conversely, in order for burglary to qualify in New Hampshire the
felony must be committed with a dangerous weapon and the death of the victim must be
caused by the use of such weapon (§ 630:1 (b) (2)). In addition, North Carolina requires that
a deadly weapon be used in its “any other felony” category (NC Article 6 § 14-17).
Several states place a dangerous weapon stipulation on their various robbery felonies
in order for the crime to qualify under the felony-murder rule.17 In addition, the state of
Illinois expressly states that a defendant must be committing a dangerous felony other than
second-degree murder in its felony murder statute (Chap 720 ILCS § 5/9-1 (a) (3)).
Alaska’s second-degree felony murder statute (the only degree the state allows)
provides for sexual assault and sexual abuse of a minor in either the first or second degree,
as well as escape. However, the state requires arson and burglary to be committed in the first
degree to qualify for second-degree murder (AS § 11.411.110 (a) (3)).

Ala Crim Code § 13A-6-2 (a) (3), KSA § 21-3436 (a) (9-10), NY Penal Law § 125.27(a) (vii)
Penal Code of Okla § 21-701.7 B, SC Code § 16-3-20 (C) (a) (1), DC Code § 22-2101); South Carolina places
a deadly weapon requirement on its larceny felony as well (§ 16-3-20 (C) (a) (1).
16
17
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In addition, Alaska allows a defendant to be convicted under the felony-murder rule when
delivering various controlled substances to a person under the age of 19 when a death results
(AS § 11.71.010 (a)). Similarly, Florida allows for felony murder if a defendant is at least 18
years of age, distributes opium, and a death occurs as a result (Fla Statutes § 782.04 (1) (a),
3).
Several states delineate felony-murder as capital murder or aggravated murder in
their statutes.18 Most jurisdictions do not require that a culpable, specific mental state be
present to qualify for a first-degree murder conviction under the felony-murder rule. They
only require that the individual commit or attempt to commit the underlying felony. Some
states go a step further by explicitly stating that individual blameworthiness is not a
requirement under the rule. For example, Mississippi offers language that if a defendant acts
“without any design to effect death” he is guilty of first-degree murder if he is engaged in
any one of the state’s qualifying felonies (Miss Code § 97-3-19). Similarly, South Dakota
states in a separate statute that lack of intent to injure does not reduce the degree of the
crime if the killing was the result of an act “imminently dangerous to human life and the
defendant evinced a depraved mind” (SD Codified Laws § 22-16-8). Similarly, Georgia
allows for a defendant to be guilty of first-degree murder for any felony if the defendant
“causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice” (Crim Code § 16-5-1).
There are several states that provide for and require a specific mental state to qualify
for first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule.

18 Ark Crim Code § 5-10-101 (a) (1), Miss Code § 97-3-19 (2) (e-f), Ohio Revised Code § 2903.01 (B), Utah
Crim Code § 76-5-202 (1) (d), and Code of Virginia § 18.2-31
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For instance, Delaware states that a felony must be committed with recklessness. However,
the statute also allows for any felony to qualify for first-degree murder when such a mental
state is present (Title 11 § 636 (a) (2)). Similarly, Maine provides that a defendant “causes the
death and [that] the death is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of [the crime] . . . ” (Crim
Code 17-A § 202).
In addition, New Hampshire requires that a defendant “knowingly cause the death”
(Crim Code § 630:1 (b)) while engaged in one of the state’s enumerated felonies to qualify
for felony murder.
Louisiana requires that the defendant possess specific intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm while engaged in a qualifying felony to be eligible for first-degree felony murder.
The statute also allows for three types of robbery: armed robbery, first-degree robbery, and
simple robbery in its criteria, and provides for aggravated kidnapping and second degree
kidnapping. Furthermore, Louisiana requires that burglary, escape, arson, and rape be
aggravated in order to qualify for first-degree felony murder (RS § 14:30 (A) (1)).
Similarly, Minnesota uses culpability language that the defendant “causes the death of
a human being with intent to effect the death of the person . . . while committing [list of
underlying felonies]” (Crim Code § 609.185 (a) (3)). Minnesota’s sexual offense felony,
however, does not require intent (§ 609.185 (a) (2)).
South Carolina’s felony murder statute exists exclusively in the state’s listing of
aggravators for the judge or jury to consider (§ 16-3-20 (C) (a) (1)). Specifically, the crime of
murder is aggravated, and subject to the death penalty, if a killing occurred while the
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defendant was in the commission of one of the state’s qualifying felonies (Petersen and
Bailey, 1991). In other words, felony murder is an automatic aggravator.19
South Dakota allows for a first-degree murder conviction under the felony-murder
rule for any of its underlying felonies if the defendant “effects the death of any victim . . . to
prevent detection or prosecution of the crime” (Codified Laws§ 22-16-4). In the states that
subscribe to capital punishment, they primarily have this provision in their list of
aggravators.
Several statutes provide for the murder of specific public officials, as well as a killing
by administering poison and torture. In Appendix B, such murders have been omitted from
the analysis in determining the criteria for felony murder due to the actual killing of an
individual and not due to a death caused by the commission of a felony. Similarly, the act of
assisting in the commission of suicide of a person under duress is also excluded for the same
reason.
Several jurisdictions include other additional allowable felonies. Table 2 below lists
additional, atypical felonies, along with the jurisdictions that allow for such felonies to qualify
under the felony-murder rule. These are in addition to the core felonies delineated in
Appendix B and Table 1.

19

See also Ala Crim Code § 13A-5-40.
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Table 2
Additional, Atypical Qualifying Felonies
Jurisdiction

Additional Qualifying Felonies

Alaska
Arizona

Gang (street) Felony
Unlawful Flight from Law Enforcement Vehicle
Using Minors in Drug Offenses

California
Colorado
Florida
Idaho
Indiana

Train Wrecking
Sale of Drugs to Minor on School Grounds
Stalking
Extortion
Consumer Product Tampering
Criminal Deviate Conduct

Kansas
Louisiana
Maryland

Endangering the Food Supply
Simple Robbery
Burning Barn/Stable/Tobacco House/Warehouse
Destructive Device (manuf/sell/distrib/transport)

Minnesota

Domestic Abuse (with past pattern)
Witness Tampering

North Dakota
Oregon

Felonious Restraint
Aggravated Assault on Child Under 14
Prostitution (compelling another person)

United States

Sabotage
Espionage

Total Jurisdictions: 14

Total Additional Felonies: 20

Sentences handed down after conviction under the felony-murder rule vary among
jurisdictions depending upon the degree of felony-murder allowable. However, a majority
provide for first-degree felony murder and a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole or, in states that utilize it, the death penalty. Interpreted by case law,
precedence dictates how the rule can be applied, along with the subsequent sentence.
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All of the jurisdictions that provide for first-degree felony murder identify which
felonies qualify under the felony-murder rule, whether they simply state that any felony
clearly dangerous to human life qualifies (Ala Crim Code § 13A-6-2 (a) (3)) if the defendant
causes the death of any person or the felonies are expressly enumerated, which is the
predominant approach.
Iowa and Kansas are among the few exceptions. Instead of providing for a list of
qualifying felonies, Iowa’s statute allows for a first-degree murder conviction if an individual
kills another person while participating in a “forcible felony” (Iowa Code § 707.2 (2)), along
with if a killing occurs while committing child endangerment or when assaulting a child and
that child’s death occurs under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life
(§ 707.2 (5)).
Similarly, Kansas states that if an inherently dangerous felony is committed and a
killing is the result, a defendant can be charged with first-degree felony murder. Kansas
includes the usual underlying felonies (in a separate statute that identifies dangerous felonies)
that most other states do, and they add felony theft, treason, and endangering the food
supply (KSA § 21-3436).
Many jurisdictions identify varying degrees of felonies that qualify, or specific
circumstances that must be present in order to qualify, under the statute. For example,
Oregon requires that a defendant cause the death of a child under 14 years of age (or a
dependent person) when the defendant has a legal duty to care for that individual, and the
defendant acted under circumstances that were reckless manifesting extreme indifference
(ORS §§ 163.115 (c) and 163.205). There must also be a pattern of assault or torture of the
victim to qualify. Likewise, the state of Connecticut allows for first, second and third-degree
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sexual assault (Penal Code § 53a-54c) to qualify for felony murder, and Colorado allows for
sexual assault in the first or second degree, or a Class 3 felony of sexual assault on a child
(Crim Code §18-3-102 (1) (b)). Connecticut’s maximum sentence is life where Colorado
offers a death sentence after conviction. Florida requires that the underlying felonies child
abuse, abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult, and stalking to be aggravated in order to
qualify for first-degree felony murder (§ 782.04 (1) (a), 2).
Delaware broadens the felony-murder rule by the language it uses in both its firstdegree (Title 11 § 636 (a) (2)) and second-degree (§ 635 (2)) felony murder statutes. For
example, the statute allows enforcement of the rule if the defendant was “engaged in the
commission of . . . any felony . . .” (§ 636 (a) (2)) for which the person has a reckless or
negligent mental state, respectively. The culpable standard of reckless provides some
protection for a defendant; however, because any felony qualifies it increases the possibility
of a conviction under Delaware’s rule.
In one of the few states that identify felony murder in a separate statute, Connecticut
provides some protection in requiring different underlying felonies for capital felony murder
versus felony murder. For example, for capital felony murder the state requires that the
crime be heightened to what is similar to aggravated murder in many states by providing for
specific killings or circumstances in order to qualify under the statute. For felony murder,
however, the specific statute provides for the main index crimes: robbery, burglary, and
kidnapping, along with various degrees of sexual assault and escape (Penal Code Chap 952 §
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53a-54c). The felony murder statute does, however, provide for an affirmative defense for an
accomplice.20
Indiana’s list of underlying felonies that qualify an offender to be convicted of firstdegree murder is not quite as long as other states, but the broad category “criminal deviate
conduct” (IC § 35-42-1-1 (2)) that is included in its list could be attached to many crimes.
Indiana’s felony murder statute does, however, provide an involuntary manslaughter charge
(IC § 35-42-1-4) depending upon the seriousness of the felony committed when the killing
occurred.
Massachusetts provides for the commission or attempted commission of a crime that
is punishable by death or life imprisonment in its first-degree felony murder statute (§ 265
sec 1). The statute does not provide for an enumerated list of qualifying felonies. This is
rather surprising inasmuch as Massachusetts does not allow for the death penalty.
Situational circumstances of the crime vary among the jurisdictions. Some allow for a
conviction if a defendant is “in the course of and in furtherance of the crime,” while the
defendant is “participating in the crime” or “committing or attempting to commit or in
immediate flight” from committing a qualifying felony and a resulting death occurs.21
Additionally, several jurisdictions allow for the felony-murder rule to apply if the defendant
causes a death while committing any felony or any conduct “under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life” (See Ark Code § 5-10-101 (a) (1) and Table
3).

20
21

See States that Allow Conviction for a Non-Triggerman section.
Refer to Appendix C for a comprehensive overview of situational circumstances in the U.S.
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Arkansas requires that this mental state apply to all of their underlying felonies, but
some states require that it only apply to specific felonies.22 Similarly, Oklahoma’s, child
abuse/cruelty to children felony requires that the defendant “willfully or with malice injure
or torture the child by using unreasonable force, or by permitting the acts to be done on the
child” (Penal Code § 21-701.7, C).23
Most jurisdictions allow the felony-murder rule to apply under various situational
circumstances. Such situations would appear to be inherently present if an individual is
committing any crime. Even though several jurisdictions require a specific mental state for
the rule to apply, most simply state that the defendant must participate or attempt to
participate in one of the qualifying felonies. Appendix C provides a comprehensive overview
of the situational circumstances among jurisdictions in the nation. Figure 2 below illustrates
this graphically.

22
23

Iowa Code 707.2, 5; Minn Crim Code § 609.185 (a) (5-7)
See also generally Colo Crim Code § 18-3-102 (1) (f).
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Figure 2
Situational Circumstances
Note: Jurisdictions that do not specifically mention that a felony qualifies in the immediate flight from the
crime, case law has interpreted the statute as such (Florida being at least one of the states).
Intent to Kill: A Look at Culpability
When a person considers what it means to intend to commit a certain crime,
probably the main thought that enters one’s mind is that an individual must willfully commit
the act, or at least contemplate the act. When determining if a person is culpable or
responsible for a killing, it is beneficial to consider and understand motivation or reasons for
committing the act. Did this person purposely intend for the result to happen? For instance,
in a landmark decision addressing the Eighth Amendment, the Arizona Supreme Court
explained that the defendants who were present when multiple killings took place could be
held responsible because the killings occurred as part of and in the course of an escape (from
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a prison), and that the deaths would not have occurred but for the assistance of the
defendants. The Court further stated that even though the defendants did not specifically
intend that the deaths take place, the fact that they did not plot out the homicides in
advance, or that they did not actually pull the trigger is of little significance (Tison v. Arizona
1987). The main question here is: Is this intent in the true sense? The Arizona Supreme
Court ruled, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed, that the circumstances in this case satisfy
the requisite intent due to the offenders’ “reckless indifference to the value of human life”
and their “major participation” in the underlying felony. The Tison case is discussed later on
in more detail.
The statutes and the courts utilize concepts such as, intentionally, knowingly,
purposefully, recklessly, or with criminal negligence to describe culpability. It has been well
established in the criminal law (Myers, 1997) that blameworthiness of the offender is
essential to criminal responsibility and punishment. The definition, along with what
constitutes each individual construct is up to the states. In repealing felony murder in
Michigan (People v. Aaron, 1980), the court explained, “criminal liability for causing a
particular result is generally not justified in the absence of some culpable mental state [with]
respect to that result.”
California’s murder statute attempts to define culpability by explaining that the
element of malice may be express or implied. Express is defined as “deliberate intention”
and implied means “when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances
attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart” (Penal Code § 188).24

24

See also generally Idaho Statutes Chap 40 § 18-4002.
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Express or implied malice requires no other mental state of malice aforethought. Neither an
awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society nor
acting despite such awareness is included within the definition of malice.
In the state of Alabama, if a person does not intend to commit murder then the
following suffices as well, “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human
life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to a person other
than himself, and thereby causes the death of another person” (Crim Code § 13A-6-2 (a)
(2)). This seems incongruent with the basic, fundamental principle of the criminal law—that
a defendant must have the specific mens rea in committing the crime. Most individuals
convicted of felony murder are more likely to be involved with a group of offenders.
Conversely, in other types of killings a defendant is more likely to act alone (Myers, 1997);
solidifying the argument that several variables and situational circumstances are involved in a
felony killing, leaving individual culpability and intent to kill tenuous.
Alaska phrases their culpability requirement in a second-degree murder statute as
“knowing that the conduct is substantially certain to cause death or serious physical injury”
or “the person knowingly engages in conduct that results in the death of another person
under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life” (AS §
11.41.110).
In 2001, the Supreme Court in North Carolina ruled that one key to a felony murder
conviction is that the defendant must have the requisite mental state of intent to commit the
underlying felony that led to the death; simple negligence is not acceptable (Whitmire, 2003).
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978; Enmund v. Florida, 1982) has
specifically ruled on intent and the need for individualized treatment of offenders, although a
35

later decision (Tison v. Arizona, 1987) set a different precedent and has compromised these
rulings.
Arizona requires no specific mental state other than what is required for the
commission of any of the enumerated felonies (ARS § 13-1105, B). The statute leaves the
prosecution wide open, as it does in most states, to apply the felony-murder rule whenever a
qualifying felony is committed.
Colorado applies the felony-murder rule in one of the broadest forms in the nation.
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled, “specific intent is not an element of felony murder; to
take a human life with malice is not an element of the crime” (People v. Scheer, 1974).
Colorado’s first-degree felony murder statute allows for a defendant to be convicted under
the statute if his mental state and actions are performed, “under circumstances evidencing an
attitude of universal malice manifesting extreme indifference he knowingly engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to a person, or persons, other than himself, and
thereby causes the death of another” (Crim Code § 18-3-102 (d)). In addition, Colorado’s
Criminal Code attempts to clarify culpability by defining the phrase “after deliberation” as
not only intentionally but that the decision to commit the act was made after the exercise of
reflection and judgment concerning the act. The statute further explains “an act committed
after deliberation is never one that has been committed in a hasty or impulsive manner” (§
18-3-101 (3)). An example of a recent felony murder case is that of Lisl Auman. As Auman
sat in the back of a police car, arrested and handcuffed after committing a burglary, the
acquaintance she met the night before shot and killed a Denver police officer (killing himself
afterwards), while fleeing the crime. She is now serving a life sentence for first-degree felony
murder. Even though Lisl Auman did not intend to kill the police officer, under Colorado’s
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felony-murder rule accomplices are liable if a death occurs during a felony or in immediate
flight (Fortado, 2004). She would be charged with the same offense if the actual shooter
were alive and also charged with murder.
The District of Columbia also uses culpability language in its first-degree murder
statute where premeditated murder and felony murder are combined in one section. It states,
Whoever, being of sound memory and discretion, kills another
purposely, either of deliberate and premeditated malice or by means of
poison . . . or without purpose to do so kills another in perpetrating or in
attempting to perpetrate any [delineated felonies]” (§ 22-2101).
In some cases, the degree of felony murder varies based upon the culpable mental
state of the offender, i.e., negligence or recklessness (See Del Code Title 11 § 635 (2)). In
Florida, however, first-degree felony murder and second-degree felony murder list the same
underlying felonies, but the difference between them is who does the actual killing. For
instance, for first-degree felony murder, the homicide must be committed by one of the
felons perpetrating the felony, while for second-degree felony murder someone other than
the person(s) perpetrating the felony commits the homicide, e.g., a police officer kills a
bystander, or a store owner kills an accomplice (William Van Poyck, personal phone
conversation, June 11, 2005). Third-degree felony murder requires an “unlawful killing of a
human being, when perpetrated without any design to effect death” when a person is
engaged in the perpetration of, or attempt to commit any felony other than the felonies
delineated in Florida’s first and second degree felony-murder statutes (§ 782.04 (4)).
Illinois provides an explanation of intent in a separate statute. It states that a person
“intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct
described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to
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accomplish that result or engage in that conduct” (720 ILCS § 5/4-4). Louisiana requires that
a defendant have “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm” in both its first and
second-degree murder statutes (RS §§ 14:30 A (1), 14:30.1 A (2), respectively).
Of course, each individual state relies on the courts to consider the facts and
circumstances of each case and apply them to the law. As an example, In People v. Belk, the
Illinois Supreme Court explained that in a high-speed chase, even though the defendant was
in possession of a stolen car and his blood alcohol level was above the legal limit, his actions
did not constitute “the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual”
(Tuite, 2003a). The state’s high court referred to past decisions, from 1994 and 2001, stating
that in both cases the defendants were involved in fatal accidents in stolen cars fleeing from
police and were convicted of first-degree murder because Illinois’s murder statute provides
“that a person commits murder when he knows his actions created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm” (Tuite, 2003a). In Belk, the Illinois Supreme Court stood firm in
its reasoning that even though the defendant’s actions created a strong probability of death
or great bodily harm, an individual’s knowledge that his actions might involve the threat or
use of force or violence is not enough to classify such felony as a forcible felony. Again this
goes back to the fundamental question: Did the individual intend the result that occurred due
to individual choice and subsequent actions?
Several states allow for any felony or conduct to qualify for felony murder (whether
first or second degree) if a specific culpable mental state is present when the felony occurs.
Table 3 below provides a listing of the states that provide for such circumstances, along with
their respective required mental state if applicable.
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Table 3
Culpability Felonies and Situations
Circumstances
Manifesting
Extreme
Indifference

Created Grave
Risk of Death
x

Recklessly
Caused
Death

Additional
Culpability
Standard

State

Type of Crime

Alabama

Any Conduct

x

Alaska*

Any Conduct

x

Knowing

Arkansas

Any Felony

x

None

Colorado

Any Conduct

x

Delaware

Any Felony

New Mexico

Any Act

x

None

North Dakota

Any Act

x

None

Oklahoma*

Any Act

x

None

Utah

Any Conduct

x

x

None

Washington

Any Conduct

x

x

None

9

4

Total

Reckless

x

Knowing
x

Reckless

1

*Second-degree felony murder statute
Any felony or act committed with the above culpability standards is associated with each state’s highest degree of felony murder.

Arkansas and Delaware are the only states that obtain a felony requirement under the
associated culpability standard. The remainder allow for felony murder if any act or conduct
takes place under the specific mental state. Additionally, in the states that permit combined
circumstances that also qualify if a person engages in conduct “under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” in conjunction with “creating a
grave risk of death”, both situations must be present to qualify under the statutes. In this
instance, Alabama only requires a reckless state of mind; Colorado requires that the defendant
knowingly engage in the conduct; and Utah and Washington require that defendant simply
engage in the conduct.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a culpable mental state of “recklessness or
extreme indifference to human life” along with being a “major participant” in an underlying
(qualifying) felony is sufficient enough to warrant a death sentence (Tison v. Arizona 1987).
The Court decided that this new culpability standard does not violate the Eighth
Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishment in terms of proportionate
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sentencing even when a defendant is not the triggerman. The Court had defined intent to kill
another way in its landmark decision involving felony murder and a death sentence in
Enmund v. Florida (1982). In Enmund, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled “intent to kill includes
the situation in which the defendant intended, contemplated, or anticipated that lethal force
would or might be used or that life would or might be taken in accomplishing the underlying
felony.” This ruling, however, has been preempted and today Tison is the prevailing case law.
Whether opponents or proponents of the felony-murder rule, culpability and a
defendant’s state of mind is discussed more often in the argument about felony murder than
anything else (Myers, 1997). Both camps realize that blameworthiness is necessary to reveal
and understand in order to justify the theory of felony murder, along with criminal
responsibility and subsequent punishment.
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A MATTER OF DEGREES: MURDER REVIEWED
This section focuses on degrees of murder available in the United States. The idea is
to reveal a variety of potential alternatives for felony murder as they apply to specific cases.
The main goal is to reflect upon the appropriate charge for a felony and resulting killing, and
to consider the appropriate sentence and desired retribution based upon the crime
committed.
Degrees of murder are variably defined among jurisdictions in the United States.
Most provide for first-degree murder, some have a separate statue defining second-degree
murder, and some use a combination of murder, and voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter.
Degrees, or levels, are most often categorized based upon the culpability of the
offender, and if applicable culpability of the accomplice who participates in the same crime.
In general, first-degree murder requires a premeditated, willful design; second-degree
murder requires a mental state of recklessness; and criminal negligence (often defined as
third-degree murder, or manslaughter) intuitively requires that an individual act with
negligence. The Model Penal Code only defines murder and manslaughter with no varying
degrees of murder (§ 210.2). This approach has only been adopted by a small number of
jurisdictions in the United States.
First-Degree Murder
First-degree murder is mainly defined as the intentional, purposeful killing of another
human being, although some states add additional, or somewhat different, culpability
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language to their statues. For example, Idaho adds “any kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing” to its first-degree murder statute (Chap 40 § 18-4003 (a)).
Most states separate culpability standards in varying degrees in their murder and
manslaughter statutes. For instance, Colorado uses culpability language “with deliberation
and intent” in its first-degree murder statute (Crim Code § 18-3-102 (a)), and uses the mental
state “knowingly” in its second-degree murder statute (§18-3-103 (1)). Similarly, Arizona
offers, “intending or knowing that the person’s conduct will cause death, the person causes
the death of another with premeditation” (ARS § 13-1105).
A majority of jurisdictions that utilize the felony-murder rule categorize it in a firstdegree murder statute. Consequently, sentencing after a conviction is based on first-degree
murder under most circumstances.
Second-Degree Murder
Arizona allows for murder in the second-degree when a person commits murder
without premeditation but such person “intentionally causes the death of another person, or
knowing that his conduct will cause death or serious physical injury . . . ” The second-degree
murder statute also allows for a reckless mental state when circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to human life the defendant’s conduct “creates a grave risk of death
and causes the death of another” (ARS 11 § 13-1104).
California exclusively distinguishes between first-degree and second-degree murder
by stating in its murder statute (after the underlying felonies that qualify for first-degree
murder) that “all other kinds of murders are of the second degree” (Penal Code § 189). It is
worth noting, however, that the California courts have interpreted the second part of the
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statute to include other felonies not enumerated in the first-degree murder portion and apply
such crimes as second-degree felony murder (Fletcher, 1980).
In its second-degree murder statute, Hawaii requires that a person “intentionally or
knowingly cause the death of another person” (HRS §707-701.5). Applying a charge of
second-degree murder in Hawaii for a felony killing would be problematic due to the
defendant’s lack of intent or knowledge of the killing; hence, there is no provision for felony
murder in that state.
A discussion about a charge of second-degree murder versus first-degree felony
murder took place just recently as a result of the Lisl Auman case out of Colorado where a
Denver police officer was tragically killed after a high-speed chase. Auman’s attorney argued
that a second-degree murder sentence (8 to 48 years) would be more appropriate for her
involvement in the crime (Fortado, 2004). However, Colorado only provides for first-degree
felony murder, and does not allow for a lesser degree. Furthermore, the state Supreme Court
has made it clear that there is no such distinction. Perhaps considering a separate statute and
sentence specifically for felony murder would be a solution. For instance, Wisconsin
provides for a combined, fixed sentence for a killing during a felony, along with the sentence
for the specific felony committed.25
Manslaughter
Manslaughter is generally defined as the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice. The Model Penal Code states that a homicide is manslaughter when it is committed
recklessly or when the homicide is committed under the influence of extreme mental or

25

See Felony Murder Typology section.
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emotional disturbance where there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness
is determined in the viewpoint and under the circumstances in the defendant’s situation as
he believed them to be (MPC § 210.3 (1) (a) and (b)). A felony murder conviction that relies
on a manslaughter charge would appear to be proportional in that the defendant acted
recklessly by committing a dangerous felony. However, most states chose to hold defendants
to a higher degree of culpability.
Some states only categorize murder into first-degree murder and manslaughter, both
voluntary and involuntary (See IC § 35-42-1-3 and § 35-42-1-4, respectively) instead of
providing for second-degree murder. Essentially, manslaughter is synonymous with seconddegree murder in this instance.
Hawaii allows for a reduced degree of first-degree murder to manslaughter as an
affirmative defense if at the time of the killing the defendant was “under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation . . .
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the circumstances as the defendant
believed them to be” (HRS § 707-702 (2)).
Indiana relies on the seriousness of the felony committed when the killing occurred
to determine whether an involuntary manslaughter charge is appropriate (§ 35-42-1-4 (c) (1)),
along with considering the same charge when a misdemeanor is committed that inherently
poses a risk of serious bodily injury (§ 35-42-1-4 (c) (2)). The state of Ohio includes felony
murder language in its involuntary manslaughter statute by stating that, “no person shall
cause the death of another . . . as a proximate result of the offender’s committing or
attempting to commit a felony” (Ohio Revised Code § 2903.04 (A)). This is essentially
Ohio’s felony-murder rule because in the state’s murder statute it requires a conviction of a
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previous similar offense (§ 2903.02 (C)) and for aggravated murder the offender must
purposely cause death while committing one of the underlying felonies (§ 2903.01 (B)).
Many states define manslaughter by requiring recklessness as the culpability standard
in causing the death of another person, or when a crime would be murder and it is
committed in the midst of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate
provocation by the victim.26
Several states provide for assisting another person to commit suicide in their
manslaughter statutes.27 Many of the state statutes are left open for interpretation and in the
discretion of the sentencing authority to determine the appropriate punishment.
Felony Murder
Intuitively, the crime of murder justly deserves a serious penalty because it entails the
highest culpability with regard to an intentional killing on the part of an offender. Seconddegree murder or manslaughter deserves a less severe penalty because the presence and
blameworthiness of recklessness or negligence is less, although the results are the same
(Simons, 1997). Felony murder is heightened to varying degrees of murder (predominately
first-degree murder) due to the dangerous act that accompanies a resulting death.
In other words, the act of committing one of the state’s qualifying felonies constitutes a level
of culpability that warrants, in most cases, a conviction for the highest degree of murder.
Myers (1997) suggests that defendants in non-felony killings are more culpable than
defendants convicted of felony murder even when there are similarities in both groups such

26 See, e.g., ARS § 13-1103, Ala Crim Code § 13A-6-3 (2), Maine Crim Code 17-A Chap 9 § 203.1 B, HRS §
707-702.
27 See Colo Crim Code § 18-3-104 (1) (b), ARS § 13-1103, A, 3, and HRS § 707-702.
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as, use of a weapon, criminal history, and mental state because defendants in non-felony
killings are more likely to have planned the killing and personally committed the act. If a
defendant is less culpable, logic dictates that he is less responsible for the criminal act. It
would appear anomalous to apply a first-degree murder statute to a person who commits
felony murder and who does not have the specific mens rea required for a first-degree murder
conviction. Clearly, a majority of the states disagree with a total of 43 subscribing to capital
murder, first-degree murder, or murder under the theory of felony murder.
Experimental studies have shown that there is a distinct separation between a felonymurder triggerman who commits an actual killing and a non-triggerman who participates in
an underlying felony where a person is killed (Finkel and Duff, 1991; Myers, 1994; Myers,
1997). More importantly, there is a sharp distinction between a felony-murder triggerman
and a premeditated murderer (Finkel and Duff, 1991). Clearly, there is empirical data
supporting fundamental differences between murder and felony murder. However, most of
the jurisdictions have not made statutory changes to reflect such differences (Fletcher, 1980).
The current research and analysis of numerous statutes verifies this point.
This research espouses that true felony murder is when a killing occurs during the
course of a felony where there is no premeditation on the part of the offender, or the
offender was not even the killer. In such cases, the killing may have been premeditated on the
part of the offender, but for the accomplice who was not the killer there was no
premeditation or intent to commit murder.
Figure 3 below illustrates the degrees in which felony murder is utilized in the United
States. There are currently five states that maintain that felony murder is a capital offense;
however, four of them require a specific mental state. There are 14 states that exclusively
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provide for first-degree murder as their lowest form of felony murder, 12 define felony
murder in a deliberate murder statute, and 24 allow for a lesser degree of murder.
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Figure 3
Degrees of Felony Murder
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APPLICATION OF THE FELONY-MURDER RULE: A SNAPSHOT
Forty-nine jurisdictions total, including the District of Columbia, and the Federal
system, subscribe to the felony murder theory to some degree. Out of those 49, about 88
percent allow for some form of first-degree or capital murder. This includes those
jurisdictions that identify felony murder in a murder statute because they are essentially
treated the same as first-degree murder. Many jurisdictions allow a conviction for a nontriggerman. Some expressly provide language in their statutes and some rely on the courts to
determine if the rule applies to an accomplice. In addition, in those jurisdictions that utilize
the death penalty most allow for a defendant to receive a death sentence for felony murder.
Jurisdictions that Allow Conviction for a Non-Triggerman
Some jurisdictions that provide for felony murder in their statues, no matter the
degree, also provide language for an accomplice or codefendant. If there is no mention of a
codefendant in the felony murder statute, there is a presumption that the felony-murder rule
can be applied if the codefendant was a main participant in the underlying felony or if there
is some nexus to the crime. The prosecution is able to bring charges in cases where an
accomplice is simply present at the scene of the felony when the death occurs. The
prosecutor, as in any case, determines which conviction she is most likely to win and charges
the defendant accordingly. A felony murder conviction is most desirable to prosecutors
because they are only required to prove intent to commit the underlying felony and not
intent for the killing that resulted from the crime.
When jurisdictions explicitly allow for an accomplice to be included in their felony
murder statute, it is typically defined as:
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A person commits murder if acting alone or with one or more other
persons, he or she commits or attempts to commit [a qualifying felony], and
in the course of and in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight
therefrom, he or she or an accomplice [emphasis added] causes the death of any
person . . .
Ark Crim Code § 5-10-10128
More than half of the jurisdictions offer no language or direction for a codefendant
in their murder statutes where they define felony murder in the highest degree.29 However,
such jurisdictions have most likely interpreted their statutes to determine how to handle a
non-triggerman case (either using the Enmund standard or the two-prong Tison test).
Because several jurisdictions require that the defendant possess a specific mental
state when committing one of the underlying felonies to qualify for the highest degree of
murder (mainly capital or first-degree murder), accomplice language is inapplicable due to
the individual culpability requirement.30

28 See also generally Ala Crim Code § 13A-6-2 (a) (3), AS § 11.41.110 (a) (3), ARS § 13-1105, A, 2, Colo Crim
Code § 18-3-102 (b), Conn Penal Code Chap 952 § 53a-54c, Main Code Title 17-A Chap 9 § 202, 1, Miss Code
§ 97-3-19 (11) (c), Mont Crim Code § 45-5-102 (1) (b), NJ Code of Criminal Justice § 2C:11-3 (3), ND Crim
Code § 12.1-16-01.1 (c), Penal Code of Okla § 21-701.7.B, ORS § 163.115 (b), Penn Crimes Code § 2502.(b),
RCW § 9A.32.030 (1) (c).
29 See Calif Penal Code § 189, Del Crim Code Title 11 § 636 (a) (2), DC Code § 22-2101 [formerly 22-2401], Fla
Statutes § 782.04 (1) (a) 2, Crim Code of GA § 16-5-1, Idaho Statutes § 18-4003 (d), 720 ILCS § 5/9-1 (a) (3),
IC § 35-42-1-1, Iowa Code § 707.2, 2, KSA § 21-3401 (b), Maryland Crim Law § 2-201 (a), Gen Laws of Mass §
265 Sec 1, Minn Crim Code § 609.185 (a) (3), Missouri Revised Statutes § 565.021 (2), Nebraska Crim Code §
28-303 (2), NRS § 200.030, 1 (b), NM § 30-2-1 A (2), NY Penal Law § 125.27, 1 (a) (vii), NC General Statutes 6
§ 14-17, RI Criminal Offenses § 11-23-1, SC Code of Laws § 16-3-5, SD Codified Laws § 22-16-4, Tenn Code §
39-13-302 (a) (2), TX Penal Code § 19.02 (b) (3), VSA § 2301, WV Code § 61-21-1, Wisconsin Crim Code §
940.03, Wyoming Criminal Code § 6-2-101 (a), US Code Title 18 Chap 51 § 1111 (a).
30 See LA RS § 14:30 A (1), NH Crim Code § 630:1 (b) (1), Ohio Revised Statutes § 2903.01 (B), Utah Crim
Code § 76-5-203 (2) (d) (ii)), Code of VA § 18.2-32.
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The figure below illustrates the number of jurisdictions that provide accomplice
language in their felony murder statutes. There are currently five states that have a specific
culpability requirement, 15 provide accomplice language in their statutes, and 29 of the
jurisdictions that subscribe to the felony-murder rule are void of direction regarding an
accomplice. This figure only includes the highest degree allowable in each of the
jurisdictions.
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Figure 4
Accomplice Language Among Jurisdictions
In Alaska’s second-degree murder statute, the only level provided for felony murder,
the statute explicitly notes “ . . . in the course of or in furtherance of that crime [the
delineated felonies] or in immediate flight from that crime, any person causes the death of a
person other than one of the participants” (AS § 11.41.110 (a) (3)).31
California does not expressly provide language about another person in its murder
statute where felonies are provided that allow for first-degree felony murder (Penal Code §
189). However, the California Supreme Court has ruled that a person who commits any of

See also Colo Crim Code § 18-3-102 (1) (b), Conn Penal Code § 952 Sec 53a-54c, ORS § 163.115 (b), RCW §
9A.32.030 (1) (c).
31
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the qualifying felonies (in the statute) accompanied by the death of another person, is guilty
of first-degree murder even if the associated killing is done by a co-felon and the killing is
intentional, negligent, or accidental (Baxter, 2004).
Several jurisdictions allow for an affirmative defense for a codefendant who is a nontriggerman under certain circumstances. The statutes normally provide amelioration:
If the accomplice did not commit the homicidal act or in any way aid
in its commission, was not armed with a deadly weapon, [and] did not
reasonably believe that any other participant would engage in conduct that
would result in serious injury.
Ark Crim Code § 5-10-10232
The affirmative defense language offers some safeguards for a non-triggerman;
however, it appears that meeting the stringent criteria would be difficult in most cases.
When it comes to sentencing a non-triggerman convicted of first-degree murder and
the individual is death eligible, the courts must rely on Tison v. Arizona (1987) when
considering an accomplice’s fate. In deciding whether a non-triggerman is eligible for the
death penalty, often referred to as the two-prong Tison culpability test, determination in
sentencing must focus on two things:
1) Whether the non-triggerman was a major participant in the underlying felony and,
2) Whether he acted with reckless indifference to the value of human life.
This mental state, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, is highly culpable and sufficient
enough to warrant a death sentence.

32

See also generally Conn Penal Code § 952 Sec 53a-54c, Maine Crim Code Title 17-A Chap 9 § 202 (2).
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Between 1977 and 1994, there were ten non-triggerman defendants convicted under
the theory of felony murder who have been executed because the law of the land allows
felony murder to qualify as a capital crime; whether an accomplice kills intentionally or
accidentally (Brown, 1997).
The Death Penalty: An Option for Felony Murder
Most of the jurisdictions that utilize the death penalty have some language in their
first-degree murder statute that includes felony murder. In addition, almost all of the
jurisdictions that utilize the death penalty allow for a death sentence for defendants
convicted of first-degree felony murder. The only exceptions are: New Hampshire, Oregon
and, surprisingly, Texas. Several of them, however, require a specific mens rea in order to be
eligible for a death sentence (See Appendix C and Table 4).
Additionally, Connecticut, Missouri, and Pennsylvania identify felony murder in
lesser degrees, so even though they subscribe to the death penalty such sentence is not
allowable for felony murder. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the maximum sentence
allowed for felony murder in jurisdictions that have to the death penalty.
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Table 4
Maximum Sentence in Death Penalty Jurisdictions
Jurisdiction
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas (1)
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas *
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska

Max Sentence
for Felony Murder
Death
Death
Death
Death
Death
Life
Death (2)
Death
Death
Death
Death
Death
Death
Life/Death (3)
Death
Death
Life
Death
Death

Jurisdiction
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York *
New Mexico
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina (5)
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
Wyoming
United States

Max Sentence
for Felony Murder
Death
Life
Death
Death
Death
Death
Life/Death (4)
Death
Life
Life
Death
Death
Death
Life
Life/Death (6)
Life/Death (7)
Death
Death
Death

Under “Max Sentence Allowed for Felony Murder” the term “Life” means life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
*Death penalty statutes deemed unconstitutional in 2004.
(1) Felony must be committed under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life for both capital and first-degree murder.
(2) Must recklessly cause death for first-degree felony murder.
(3) Requires specific intent for first-degree felony murder.
(4) Requires that the defendant act purposely in killing during the felony to qualify for aggravated murder.
(5) Provides for underlying felonies in its listing of aggravators.
(6) Requires an intentional and knowing mental state while engaged in a felony to be death eligible.
(7) Requires a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing while in the commission of a felony to qualify for capital murder.

Figure 5 below graphically illustrates the status of felony murder and the death
penalty in the United States. Out of the 38 jurisdictions that subscribe to the theory and
utilize the death penalty, three jurisdictions that have first-degree felony murder do not allow
a death sentence under any circumstances, three do not allow a death sentence due to
providing exclusively for lesser degrees of felony murder, six states call for a specific
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requisite mental state to qualify for the death penalty, and 26 allow for a death sentence
following a conviction of first-degree murder for causing a death while committing an
underlying felony.
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Figure 5
Felony Murder and the Death Penalty
The literature reveals that, to a large degree, the death penalty has been reserved for
those defendants convicted of felony murder (Peterson and Bailey, 1991 and Myers, 1997).
In Peterson and Bailey’s study on deterrence for felony murder, capital punishment and the
media, data revealed that out of 93 executions, 72-percent, (during a span of 11 years) were
murders related to robbery, rape, burglary, and kidnapping. These results may be misleading,
however, because if a killing occurs during a felony it does not automatically mean it was
exclusively felony murder, as the homicide may have been deliberate.
America’s attachment to the felony-murder rule resembles the attachment to the
death penalty (Fletcher, 1980). The penchant for both theories and beliefs lives on in a
society that continues to separate itself from the Western world. According to the literature,
support for the death penalty drops considerably when an alternative sentence of life

54

imprisonment without the possibility of parole is offered (See Barkan and Cohn, 2005).
Current societal views may side with Finkel and Duff (1991) in believing whether a death
sentence for defendants in felony-murder situations is equitable and just or unfair and
excessive.
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PROPORTIONALITY IN CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
The idea of punishment and, ultimately, deterrence is rooted in three components of
the Classical theory of criminology: that crime should be punished with certainty, severity,
and celerity (Maestro, 1973). The fundamental notion of Cesear Beccaria’s theory, and the
main purpose, appears to have been lost over time. Obviously, an individual must believe
that punishment will be certain in order for any deterrent effect, so that is fairly clear. The
celerity portion of the Classical theory is also rather straight forward, as punishment for a
crime must surely be swift providing a temporal relationship if a person is to remember why
he is being punished.
It is the opinion of this research that the true intent of the severity component of
Beccaria’s theory is what has been transformed over time, and that this distortion has
compromised the integrity of the theory. The initial purpose of the severity portion of the
Classical theory was meant to curtail authorities from using excessive punishment.
Specifically, the severity of punishment was designed for proportionality purposes—to weigh
the punishment with the crime—and not to be used to incarcerate defendants (mainly young
men, but women’s rates are increasing) for long periods of time.
Sentencing
In general, the average sentence served in state prisons has decreased from 1992 to
2000. However, defendants convicted of a felony in 2000 were more likely to serve more of
their sentence. In addition, in 2000 68-percent of all convicted felons received a sentence of
incarceration. Although the length of sentence that a felon received from state courts
decreased from 1992 to 2000, the actual time served increased during that same period
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(Durose and Langan, 2003). According to Myers (1997), in many instances defendants
convicted of felony murder are sentenced more severely than defendants convicted of other
types of murder, although they are no more culpable.
Some states have provided safeguards for many offenders. For example, Kansas
offers direction for individualized sentencing of offenders in a separate statute, which states
that sentencing shall be liberally construed and that persons convicted of a crime should be
dealt with in accordance with their “individual characteristics, circumstances, needs, and
potentialities as revealed by case studies . . . ” (KSA § 21-4601). Additionally, in Maine felony
murder is considered a Class A crime and the sentencing statute directs the court to set a
definite period of time not to exceed 30 years (Title 17-A Chap 51 §1252, 2, A). The
sentencing authority also has guided discretion, within the state’s sentencing guidelines, to
consider the facts and circumstances of each individual case and sentence the defendant
accordingly. This punishment may appear excessive considering that the punishment for a
person convicted of murder is a sentence of 25 years to life (Title 17-A Chap 51 §1251).
There is certainly an argument for felony murder to be reduced to second-degree
murder where the sentence would, arguably, be proportionate to the crime. In the state of
Maryland, the sentence for second-degree murder is incarceration for up to 30 years (Crim
Law § 2-204 (b)). This type of sentencing in considering the facts and circumstances of each
case, along with individualized treatment of defendants, is a fundamental concept of the
criminal law.
Prosecutors favor the felony-murder rule because their job is much easier if they only
have to prove that the felony was an intentional act and not prove that the killing itself was
intentional (in most jurisdictions). In addition, in jurisdictions that allow for a first-degree
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murder conviction and subsequent death sentence, bargaining power is always available and
frequently utilized to obtain a life sentence. Is it fair and just to sentence an individual to
death if the person does not intentionally commit murder? Clearly, this is the center of the
argument.
Should Felony-Murder Defendants be Eligible for the Death Penalty?
Sentencing for felony murder is an important topic in the discourse because a
conviction under the rule allows for a sentence of death under various circumstances and in
most jurisdictions. In almost all of the states that utilize the death penalty, a first-degree
felony murder conviction allows a defendant to be eligible for a death sentence. Although
this research does not cover the topic of the death penalty per se, since felony murder is the
most common type of capital murder nationwide (Peterson and Bailey, 1991; Myers, 1997),
and subsequent sentence of death, it is worth discussing.
There has been much discussion about whether the death penalty, specifically, deters
the crime of murder. Capital punishment has what is called the “brutalizing” effect in that
for a short time after an execution takes place the crime of murder actually increases instead
of serving as a deterrent. Peterson and Bailey (1991) explained that instead of deterring
killings an execution illustrates that it is appropriate to kill those who have gravely offended
society. This reasoning exists in the idea that the fact that “duly appointed officials”
performing such killings on “duly convicted offenders” could be forgotten by touting that
such offenders deserve to die. A sentence of death as a deterrent for felony murder is
tenuous due to the lack of intent to commit the killing. Furthermore, relating deterrence and
the felony-murder rule is illogical due to the absence of such intent.
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After the death penalty was deemed to violate the Eighth Amendment due to the
arbitrary and capricious manner in which it was being applied (Furman v. Georgia, 1972), the
state of Georgia (and most other states) scrambled to create a death penalty statute that
would pass muster with the high Court. Pursuant to Gregg v. Georgia (1976), in designing a
separate guilt and penalty phase sentencing structure specifically for death cases that the U.S.
Supreme Court would accept, all death penalty jurisdictions have adopted an aggravation and
mitigation process for death eligible cases. In keeping with Gregg, jurisdictions now require
that at least one aggravator be present for the defendant to be sentenced to death and, in
most jurisdictions, a judge or a jury is to prove aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt when determining whether to impose a death sentence.33
In jurisdictions that do not subscribe to the death penalty, the sentence for felony
murder is still quite lengthy with most allowing for life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole. The state of Wisconsin approaches it differently by only permitting an additional
15 years over the sentence allowable for the felony committed when the killing takes place.
Table 5 provides a list of those jurisdictions and the respective maximum sentence allowable
after a conviction of felony murder.

See, e.g., Ark Crim Code Title 5 Chap 6 § 5-4-603 (a), Colo Crim Code § 18-1.3-1201 (d), Del Crim Code Title
11 § 4209 (e) (1), Idaho Statutes Chap 40 § 18-4004, and LA C.Cr.P. Art. § 905.3.
33
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Table 5
Maximum Sentence in Non-Death Penalty Jurisdictions
Jurisdiction

Max Sentence Allowed
for Felony Murder

Alaska

99 Years

Dist of Columbia

Life

Iowa

Life

Maine

30 Years

Massachusetts

Life

Minnesota

Life

North Dakota

Life

Rhode Island

Life

Vermont

Life

West Virginia

Life

Wisconsin

Specific Felony Sentence
plus 15 yrs max

Under “Max Sentence Allowed for Felony Murder” the term “Life” means life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.

For the jurisdictions that utilize the death penalty, they typically use a weighing
scheme to determine aggravators and migitigators. However, instruction and direction
explaining the process is scarce. For example California, as in most jurisdictions, vaguely
explains in their statute that the triers of fact will weigh the aggravators and the mitigators
(Penal Code § 190.3 (k)) and determine the sentence based upon which set outweighs the
other. In California both are referred to as special circumstances. Like most other
jurisdictions, California’s aggravators are much lengthier, with a total of 22, than their
statutory mitigators, with a total of eleven.
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Idaho explicitly provides language in its sentencing statute for first-degree felony
murder, which states in part that if a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, does not find a
statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt or if the death penalty is not
sought, the court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not
less than ten years (Chap 40 § 18-4004).34 It seems implausible that a judge or jury would not
find at least one of the many aggravators that would apply to a defendant who commits one
of Idaho’s ten underlying felonies.
Aggravators
The main theme identified among aggravators that jurisdictions provide for
determining whether to sentence an individual to life or death are fairly consistent. The most
common are the prior conviction of a violent offense aggravator, and that the defendant
created a “grave risk of death” to other persons. Although some of the language may be
slightly different, following is a listing of the main aggravators used by jurisdictions that
utilize the death penalty after a conviction of felony murder. The list is derived from various
statutes; however, most use some version as their core circumstances.
!

Previously convicted of a serious offense, involving use of, or threat of, force
or violence upon another person.35

!

The defendant’s course of conduct resulted in the deaths of two or more
persons.

Ring v. Arizona (2002) would eventually compel courts to abide by this standard (See Richardson, 2004).
This has been construed as sufficing for a serious offense if committed on the same occasion as the
homicide in question (See, e.g., ARS Crim Code § 13-703, F).
34

35
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!

In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave
risk of death to another person or persons in addition to the person
murdered.

!

The crime was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
manner.

!

The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or
promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value (Contract killing).

!

The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane in that
it involved torture, or depravity of mind.

!

The defendant committed the offense while in custody of the department of
corrections.36

!

The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or prosecution or affecting an escape from custody.

!

The murdered person was an on duty peace officer who was killed in the
course of performing the officer’s official duties and the defendant knew, or
should have known, that the murdered person was a peace officer.

States continue to allow for additional aggravators to a degree that widening of the
net is taking place at an alarming rate. Colorado is a prime example, as it allows for all of the
most common aggravators, and adds several others to its list.

36

An offender on probation for a felony offense qualifies under this aggravator.
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Colorado also includes, in part, if:
!

The defendant unlawfully and intentionally, knowingly, or with universal
malice manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life generally,
killed two or more persons during the commission of the same criminal
episode.

!

The defendant’s possession of the weapon used constituted a felony offense
(Crim Code § 18-1.3-1201 (5)).

Delaware also provides the following additional aggravators:
!

The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the
commission of, (attempt or in fleeing) to commit any degree of rape,
unlawful sexual intercourse, arson, kidnapping, robbery, sodomy or
burglary.37

!

The victim was 62 years of age or older.

!

The victim was a child 14 years of age or younger, and the murder was
committed by an individual who is at least 4 years older than the victim
(Crim Code Title 11 § 4209 (e)).

37 Like Delaware, such underlying felonies are aggravated in several of the states that utilize the death penalty;
hence, a conviction under the felony-murder rule is automatically aggravated (See also, SC Code of Laws Chap 3
Article 1 § 16-3-5, Fla Statutes § 921.141 (a) (5)).
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Arkansas adds:
!

The capital murder was committed against a person whom the defendant
knew or reasonably should have known was especially vulnerable to the
attack because: (a) either a temporary or permanent severe physical or mental
disability which would interfere with the victim’s ability to flee or to defend
himself; or (b) The person was twelve (12) years of age or younger (Crim
Code Title 5 Chap 4; 6 § 5-4-604).

Along with the core aggravators, Florida includes additions such as:
!

The victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to advanced
age or disability, or because the defendant stood in a position of familial or
custodial authority over the victim.

!

The capital felony was committed by a criminal street gang member
(§ 921.141 (a) (5)).

Interestingly, Illinois provides an aggravator that includes if an inmate is killed on the
grounds of an institution or facility run by the Department of Corrections (Chap 720 § 5/9-1
(b) (2)). Illinois also allows aggravation of a murder if the victim was killed as a result of the
hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, or bus (Chap 720 § 5/9-1 (b) (4)).
Emergency medical technicians, paramedics, ambulance drivers, and other first-aid
professionals are also added to Illinois’s list (Chap 720 § 5/9-1 (b) (12)), along with if the
defendant was a principal administrator, organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug
conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of authority superior to that of all the rest of
the members (Chap 720 § 5/9-1 (b) (13)), or if the defendant knew the murdered victim was
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a teacher or any other employee of a school and is on school grounds at the time of the
crime (§ 5/9-1 (b) (20)).
States that have the death penalty and weigh circumstances of the crime also provide
statutory mitigators that the defense can present. In all states, the list of mitigators is much
shorter than the list of aggravators. This is not problematic in that it is permissible for the
defense to present mitigation that is even somewhat relevant to the case. The implied
message in the growing number of aggravators, however, is that the states want to pursue
and secure a death sentence whenever possible. As society grows and evolves it is
understandable that the number of circumstances available to aggravate a killing would also
continue to grow. The concern is that as the net continues to widen and the aggravators
continue to increase (most states have as many as 20) more defendants are eligible for death
sentences when other sentences may be more appropriate. It is disturbing that the majority
of defendants’ convictions who are sentenced to death rely on the theory of felony murder
(Peterson and Bailey, 1991; Myers, 1997). It is probably not too difficult to find one
aggravator out of 20 when a defendant commits a dangerous felony.
Mitigators
The states provide several statutory mitigators for the defense to present, which
serves to mitigate the killing to some degree. If states do not provide language in their
statutes that any other mitigation relevant to the case can be included it is implied. The U.S.
Supreme Court decided as much in Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) where the Court ruled that
mitigating factors must be considered in an individualized manner as required by the Eighth
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and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases. However, jurisdictions continue to provide
statutory mitigatiors for death cases. Some examples include:
!

The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired as
a result of mental disease or defect.38

!

The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.

!

The absence of any significant prior conviction.

!

The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person 39

!

The defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another, but his
participation was relatively minor.40

!

The defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct would
cause, or would create, a grave risk of causing death to another person.

!

The defendant’s age at the time of the offense.

!

The influence of drugs or alcohol.

Colorado adds “but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution” (§ 18-1.3-1201 (4)).
Colorado adds the lack of a defense to this mitigator (Crim Code § 18-1.3-1201 (4)).
40 Colorado again clarifies for the courts that the defendant’s participation is not so minor as to be used as a
defense.
38
39
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Colorado provides for a few other statutory mitigating factors to be considered after
conviction in a death penalty case such as:
!

The extent of the defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement officers or
agencies and with the office of the prosecuting district attorney.

!

The good faith, although mistaken, belief by the defendant that
circumstances existed which constituted a moral justification for the
defendant’s conduct.

!

The defendant is not a continuing threat to society—future dangerousness
(Crim Code § 18-1.3-1201 (4)).

Some states provide for mitigation if the victim was a participant in the defendant’s
conduct or consented to the act.41 Illinois also allows for mitigation if the defendant’s
background includes a history of extreme emotional or physical abuse (720 ILCS § 5/9-3 (c)
(4-7)). Additionally, the state of Kansas provides mitigation if a defendant was suffering
from Posttraumatic Stress Disorder at the time of the crime, which was caused by violence
or abuse by the victim (KSA Article 46 § 21-4637 (h)).
Again, pursuant to Eddings most, if not all, non-statutory mitigation is allowable at
the penalty phase of a death penalty trial. It appears that the states are providing mitigating
factors in their statutes for direction, along with legal safeguards for defendants. After
Eddings, however, it is not necessary to continue to add mitigators as it is to continue to add
aggravators.

41

See Fla Statutes § 921.141 (6), and 720 ILCS § 5/9-3 (c) (4-7).

67

The Courts Decide: The Death Penalty as it Applies to a Non-Triggerman
There are three main decisions (Enmund v. Florida, 1982; Cabana v. Bullock, 1986; Tison
v. Arizona, 1987) that were handed down by the United States Supreme Court on the issue of
sentencing a non-triggerman to death under the felony-murder rule. The Court’s lack of
direction in these final decisions (Kling, 1988) has resulted in incongruent and unpredictable
findings.42
In Enmund v. Florida (1982), Earl Enmund was the codefendant in a robbery of an
elderly couple in their home. While he served as the lookout and getaway driver parked
around the corner from the house, the couple was shot and killed by his codefendants
during the robbery. Enmund was convicted of first-degree felony murder under Florida law
and subsequently sentenced to death.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in a 5-4 decision, that imposition of the death penalty
(Enmund v. Florida, 1982) constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment when a person aids in a felony “where murder is committed by others but who
himself does not kill, attempt to kill, intend to kill, or contemplate that life would be taken or
that lethal force might be employed.” The high court ruled that it was a violation of the ban
against cruel and unusual punishment and vacated Enmund’s death sentence.

42

See, e.g., Van Poyck v. State, 1990; Benedith v. State, 1998.
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A Mississippi case (Cabana v. Bullock, 1986), which was initially an Eighth
Amendment claim, resulted in a Sixth Amendment issue in whether a jury or “some
appropriate tribunal” should determine whether Bullock “killed, attempted to kill, or
intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be used” (Cabana v. Bullock, 1986).
Bullock was an accomplice in a killing of a friend after an argument ensued over a debt that
was owed. This issue became a moot point after Ring v. Arizona (2002) came to light in which
a trial judge alone could not determine aggravating and mitigating factors without violating a
defendant’s right to a jury trial (Richardson, 2004). The outcome in the Bullock case,
nevertheless, significantly limited the protections for defendants mandated by Enmund
(Kling, 1988). Even though Ring now takes precedence over Bullock, the Ring decision was
not retroactive and it is highly probable that many cases went through the courts before that
time.
About five years after the Enmund ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down
another decision pertaining to a death sentence for a non-triggerman convicted under the
theory of felony murder (Tison v. Arizona, 1987). In this case, the Court went the other way
and ruled that a felony murder conviction that allows for the death penalty for a nontriggerman does not violate the U.S Constitution’s Eighth Amendment ban against cruel and
unusual punishment as it applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. The facts of
the case reveal that the Tison brothers, Ricky, Raymond, and Donald, allegedly planned an
escape to help free their father from an Arizona state prison. On escape, the three boys, their
father and the father’s cellmate abducted and robbed a family of four at gunpoint. The boys
stood near by while the two convicts tragically shot and killed the entire family. They were
convicted in Arizona and sentenced to death under the theory of felony murder.
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At the time the brothers, both Ricky and Raymond, were 19 and 20 years old,
respectively, and this fact served as a mitigating factor for the lower court when determining
their sentence. There were other mitigators established, but none were enough to persuade
the lower court to abandon the death penalty. Police killed the third brother amidst the
capture and the father (Gary Tison) died days later in the desert after fleeing.
In a heated 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the Tison brothers
were guilty of first-degree felony murder, and subsequently eligible for the death penalty.
The Court held that the Eighth Amendment “does not prohibit the death penalty as
disproportionate in the case of a defendant whose participation in a felony that resulted in
murder is ‘major’ and whose mental state is one of ‘reckless indifference’” (Tison v. Arizona,
1987). This is the standard the U.S. Supreme Court left for the state courts to apply to future
cases. Sometime after this final decision, the state of Arizona apparently provided some
relief for the two brothers because they currently reside at the Arizona State Penitentiary
both serving life sentences (Arizona Department of Corrections).
Florida took its turn at interpreting Tison in Van Poyck v. State (1990); cert denied.
William Van Poyck and his codefendant, Frank Valdes, attempted to free a friend from a
state prison transport van in downtown West Palm Beach, Florida. During the incident, a
prison guard was shot and killed by Valdes, and both men were convicted of first-degree
felony murder and sentenced to death. On Van Poyck’s direct appeal to the Florida Supreme
Court, the state’s high court specifically found that the evidence was insufficient to prove
that Van Poyck was the triggerman. However, they did find that the evidence was sufficient
enough to sustain a conviction of first-degree felony murder. The Court conducted a Tison
analysis and upheld the death sentence based upon the following finding:
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Although the record does not establish that Van Poyck was the triggerman, it
does establish that he was the instigator and the primary participant in this
crime. He and Valdez [sic] arrived at the scene ‘armed to the teeth.’ Since
there is no question that Van Poyck played the major role in this felony
murder and that he knew lethal force could be used, we find that the death
sentence is proportional.
(Van Poyck v. State, 1990, p. 1070-71)
The above analysis appears deficient in establishing the second prong of the Tison
test in that the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. For instance, being
“armed to the teeth”, as the Court explained, does not seem to meet the definition of “acting
with reckless indifference to human life” in that it would virtually qualify every armed person
committing a felony. The U.S. Supreme Court made it clear in Tison back in 1987 that
something more is required other than mere participation in the underlying felony for a
death sentence to be appropriate. Under the Van Poyck rationale any armed robber, armed
burglar, or armed kidnapper who participated in a crime where a homicide occurred would
automatically be deemed to have met the second prong of Tison and would be eligible for the
death penalty. This contradicts Tison’s holding that a mere restatement of the felony-murder
rule cannot be used to establish the second prong.
There has been great concern about the two Tison requirements overlapping. For
instance, in some felonies one could properly conclude that any major participant
automatically exhibits reckless indifference to human life. Therefore, being a major
participant could often provide significant support for a finding of reckless indifference
(Kling, 1988). It appears that this is precisely what has happened in William Van Poyck’s
case.
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About eight years later, the Florida Supreme Court ruled the other way in Benedith v.
State (1998). Arturo Benedith was sentenced to death for allegedly robbing and killing a man
during a transaction in which the victim was selling his vehicle. On appeal, the Court found
that even though there was sufficient evidence that Benedith robbed and murdered the
victim, his death sentence was disproportionate because there was no proof of his mental
state beyond a reasonable doubt nor that he actually killed the victim. The Court ruled:
Mere participation in a robbery that resulted in murder was not enough
culpability to warrant the death penalty even if the defendant anticipated that
lethal force might be used because the possibility of bloodshed is inherent
during the commission of any violent felony and this possibility is generally
foreseeable and foreseen.
(Benedith v. State, 1998)
Applying the Tison test in Arturo Benedith’s case yielded him a reversal of his death
sentence, which is in sharp contrast to what the Court held in 1990 in Van Poyck v. State. The
Court explained, however, that the death penalty might be a proportional punishment if the
evidence shows that the defendant was a major participant in the crime and that he acted with
reckless indifference to the value of human life. What makes Benedith’s case so different? How does
the Court distinguish levels of reckless indifference?
The anomalous result in the Van Poyck case is that the Florida Supreme Court upheld
a death sentence for a non-triggerman convicted of a non-premeditated murder (Van
Poyck).
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In contrast, the Court has vacated the death sentences of numerous felony-murder
defendants, based upon Tison, even when the defendant was the actual killer.43 In light of
these cases, it appears even more inconsistent and, arguably egregious, in affirming Van
Poyck’s death sentence. In addition, the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly reduced the
death sentences of defendants convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, including
multiple murders, on the grounds of disproportionality.44 Therefore, despite the Florida
Supreme Court’s oft-repeated admonishment that “ . . . in Florida, we have repeatedly stated
that the ultimate punishment of death is reserved for the most aggravated and indefensible
of crimes committed by the most culpable of offenders”45, Van Poyck, a man who has killed
nobody, remains on Florida’s death row due to the convergence of the felony-murder rule
with the law of principals. Specifically, all accomplices are equally responsible under the law
for all criminal acts that take place during the commission of a crime.

See, e.g., Terry v. State (Fla. 1996), where the defendant was the triggerman in a felony murder and the death
sentence was reduced to life imprisonment and, similarly, Jackson v. State (Fla. 1991) where the defendant was
the triggerman in a robbery and resulting murder where the death sentence was reduced to life where there was
insufficient evidence to establish that Jackson’s state of mind had risen to such a level of reckless indifference
as to warrant a death sentence for felony murder.
44 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. State (Fla. 1988) where defendant’s sentence was reduced to life imprisonment even
though he shot and killed a police officer while holding several people hostage, and despite the existence of five
aggravating factors.
45
Brennan v. State (Fla. 1999). See also DeAngelo v. State (Fla. 1993) “This Court has repeatedly noted that the
death penalty is reserved for the most aggravated and unmitigated of crimes” and Larkins v. State (Fla. 1999)
“As we have stated time and again, death is a unique punishment. Accordingly, the death penalty must be
limited to the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murders.”
43
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THE COURTS IN ACTION
After surveying the nation to ascertain the status of the felony-murder rule, it seemed
appropriate to take a look at how the rule is currently being applied. Below are several
examples of felony murder situations from various jurisdictions in the United States.
California
In a recent, tenuous case out of California, three defendants committed burglary and
robbery that resulted in the death of a homeowner. Apparently, the three acquaintances went
to one of the defendant’s residence with the intent to commit the underlying crimes. After
tying the homeowner up and burglarizing the house, the two boys left with the goods. The
victim, (one of the defendant’s stepmother) subsequently, died of asphyxiation. A jury
convicted the boys under California’s felony-murder rule and they were sentenced to 25
years to life in prison. On appeal, the boys alleged that their friend smothered her
stepmother for her own personal reasons after they left and that there was no connection
between the felony and the death (Baxter, 2004). The California Supreme Court ruled that as
long as the killing bore some relation to the robbery the boys committed, other than just
occurring temporally, the sentence could stand. The justices concluded that there was
substantial evidence to determine a logical nexus in that the killing took place to eliminate
the only witness to the crime. However, it is noteworthy that the Court made it a point to
emphasize that the felony-murder rule is not so broad that it can be used to convict a
defendant when the crime has no relation to the killing whatsoever. There must be a clear,
logical connection between the killing and the felony; however, no proof is required that the
killing was in furtherance of the underlying felony. This, the Court reasoned, is the check on
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abuse of the rule (Baxter, 2004). Essentially, the felony-murder rule applies when a killing is
committed in the perpetration of a felony as long as the killing and the felony are considered
a continuous transaction.
Colorado
In People v. Auman, (2002), the Colorado Supreme Court explained that an
individual’s liability for felony murder is not terminated upon a defendant’s arrest. There was
question about the phrase “immediate flight therefrom” due to Auman being handcuffed in
the backseat of a police car when her accomplice shot and killed a Denver police officer.
The Court stated that in the statute the phrase is set off by commas and is not restricted to a
defendant’s own immediate flight. 46 The jury may look to the totality of the circumstances to
determine exactly when felony murder liability terminates. Furthermore, a killing committed
shortly after a defendant’s arrest may be a natural and probable consequence of the
defendant’s actions.
Colorado has one of the toughest felony murder statutes in the country. The courts
there have construed the felony-murder rule to apply to circumstances when a person is not
present when the killing takes place, but is present during the commission of the underlying
felony. As stated earlier, the state of Colorado also only allows for first-degree felony
murder; lesser degrees are not provided.

46

Refer to Appendix C for a breakdown of the states and how they apply circumstances for felony murder.
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Illinois
In a 2001 case, the Illinois Supreme Court reestablished how the felony-murder rule
should be applied. The Court, in People v. Morgan, reasoned that a 14-year old defendant
could not be charged with felony murder based upon aggravated battery and aggravated
discharge of a firearm. The Appellate Court stated, and the Illinois Supreme Court
subsequently agreed, that to allow such a conviction would eliminate second-degree murder
and the requirement that the state prove the requisite intentional or purposeful killing in
most murder cases (Tuite, 2003b). This case contradicted the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling
back in 1975 in People v. Viser. In Viser, the Court upheld a felony-murder conviction with
aggravated battery as the underlying felony where the victim died from the battery. The
Court was recently faced with making a decision when People v. Pelt (2003) was challenged.
Pelt was found guilty of felony murder for shaking his infant son and throwing the baby
across the room killing him; the underlying felony being aggravated battery.
Because the Court sided with the Morgan case, now the Morgan rule, the defendant
(Pelt) was re-sentenced for the aggravated battery charge because that was the only charge
left. The Illinois Supreme Court reiterated that allowing felony murder charges when the
underlying felony is what caused the death would essentially “eliminate the need for the state
to prove an intentional or knowing killing . . . ” (Tuite, 2003b). Instead of seeking a firstdegree felony murder conviction, it seems more plausible to charge the defendant with
second-degree murder or manslaughter.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s reversal of a felonymurder conviction that included the felony aggravated possession of a stolen vehicle. In this
case (People v. Belk, 2003), a 16-year old had stolen a van and was in high pursuit from the
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police driving over 100 mph. The teen and his accomplice ended up smashing into a car at
an intersection killing two people. In deciding Belk, the Court made a sharp distinction with
previous cases in rulings where defendants knew their codefendants were armed at the time
of the felony and, therefore, could infer that force would be used (Tuite, 2003a). The Illinois
Supreme Court clearly does not consider these circumstances as qualifying under the state’s
first-degree felony murder statute. Writing for the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Tuite urges
law practitioners in both prosecution and defense camps to consider the Belk Court’s
reasoning and apply it to other cases.
Maryland
The Court of Appeals in a Maryland case reversed a felony-murder conviction and
explained what was unacceptable in that state. The lower court sentenced Jeffrey Allen to
felony murder on the premise of a robbery that took place after the victim was killed. Allen,
who was a father of three and engaged to be married, met a gay man, Butler, on “the Stroll”
in Washington, D.C. Allen went to Butler’s house, they had sex, and he spent the night.
After waking up in the morning (being without a car and dependent upon Butler for
transportation), Allen was ready to go home. After Butler balked at his request, Allen
indicated that he was going to take Butler’s car and drive himself home. A scuffle ensued in
which Allen took a knife and stabbed Butler to death. After the killing, Allen took the car
and ended up running it into a ditch; calling police shortly afterwards. Allen was convicted
of, among several other charges, felony murder based upon the robbery of Butler’s car. The
Appeals Court ruled that the judge incorrectly erred in instructing the jury “the requisite
connection between use of force and the formulation of intent to rob is satisfied if they are
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part and parcel of the same occurrence which involved the death.” The Court went on to
explain “an afterthought [in committing] robbery cannot serve as the basis for a felony
murder where that robbery is the predicate felony” (Geier, 2004). It appears that Maryland
has also set limits on how the felony-murder rule will be applied in their state.
North Carolina
Recently, there has been heated argument about what constitutes a proportionate
sentence when applying the felony-murder rule in North Carolina. A concerned citizen was
so appalled by the life sentence a young girl received when she was convicted of first-degree
felony murder, a group was formed called “North Carolinians for Felony Murder Rule
Change.” The facts of the case state that the defendant, Janet Danahey, was angry with her
boyfriend and started a blazing fire outside of his apartment building by setting a box of
Christmas decorations on fire. Tragically, the fire spread killing four young adults; all
affiliated with the University of North Carolina where Danahey herself is a graduate
(Whitmire, 2003). This recent North Carolina case has generated a great deal of interest and
concern from members of the state’s legislature. Even though Danahey was not given a
death sentence, although she was threatened with it and made a deal by pleading guilty to life
in prison, apparently the case instilled enough fear with the possibility of such a sentence
when a person does not intend to kill anyone.
As a response, there are two bills that have been introduced in both the North
Carolina Senate and the House of Representatives. One version of the bill would repeal the
felony-murder rule altogether, while the other bill would remove the death penalty from the
statute (Swofford, 2003). In Danahey’s case, however, when her lawyers made a deal with
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the prosecution they gave up any right to appeal her life sentence, so even if the version of
the North Carolina bill that passes repeals the felony-murder rule unless it is made
retroactive Danahey does not have much hope.
Washington
The legislature in Washington recently informed the state’s high court that they
certainly did intend to include aggravated assault as one of the underlying felonies, which
increases a charge to felony murder if an individual is killed during the course of such crime.
The Washington Supreme Court’s belief is that an aggravated assault that results in a murder
would typically be tried as second-degree murder or manslaughter and not felony murder. It
appears that one of the main reasons the legislature is objecting to the ruling of the Court is
because it could potentially affect approximately 300 inmates currently convicted of felony
murder with an underlying felony of aggravated assault (Cook, 2003). Instead of
contemplating the aftermath of such a decision, it would seem more appropriate to consider
the issue on its merits rather than how many inmates could possibly be released from prison.

79

WHY DOES SOCIETY PUNISH PEOPLE?
A few ideas come to mind when one thinks about why the criminal justice system,
and ultimately society, punishes people. Probably the most common reason, and the concept
people understand the most, is retribution. In general, society punishes people who deserve
to be punished—those people who commit dangerous crime and break the law. Just deserts
is a difficult theory to abandon. After all, why should the majority of society obey the laws
and those who commit crime pay no consequence? Another reason society punishes
offenders is incapacitation—to keep dangerous people away from the rest of society.
Additionally, utilitarians believe that punishment is warranted only if it serves some greater
purpose that is for the betterment of society as a whole.
When analyzing retribution, a distinct division exists between culpability and
wrongdoing—mens rea and actus reus, respectively. Culpability is a necessary condition of
criminal liability and it must coincide with the wrongdoing. In conduct that makes the world
worse, the punishment that retribution relies upon must be a direct relation to the
blameworthiness of the offender (Simons, 1997). Consider the Auman case out of Coloardo.
Should Lisl Auman be serving a life sentence for felony murder if she did not intend to kill
the police officer? The fact that Auman was sitting in the back of a police car handcuffed is
of primary consideration when answering this question. Does society believe that severe
punishment is absolutely necessary under such circumstances?
Incapacitation is also a simple construct most people understand. The courts
incarcerate those offenders who commit crimes and who are deemed to be a future danger
to society. If bad people are segregated from the good perhaps the nation will be a safer
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place. It is the opinion of this research that when people are born, they are hedonistic
individuals. For instance, individuals inherently seek pleasure and avoid pain at all cost.
Conversely, people can learn how to participate in evil acts, which makes it erroneously
appear that they are inherently evil. Participating in a dangerous felony does not necessarily
indicate that an individual has a propensity to commit violent acts, although this conclusion
would seem a likely presumption. As an example, Myers’s (1997) found that defendants in
cases not subject to conviction under the felony-murder rule were more likely to have a prior
record of serious felony convictions. In general, socialization through role models and
institutions determines the type of personality (although some traits, arguably, are biological)
a person will have, and subsequently, the type of behavior one will engage in throughout
certain stages of life. A person must be socialized and taught how to refrain from acting in
his own self-interest.
Is the crime that Lisl Auman was sentenced to life for something that she is going to
do again? Is the unforeseeable killing of a police officer irredeemable? Auman was just
recently granted a new trial. One may think that the reason is due to societal values and
human dignity, but that is not the case. Auman will receive a new trial—and be subject to
another mandatory life sentence—on a faulty jury instruction (Rivers, 2005).
Societal viewpoints change over time, and the courts eventually shift in their
opinions and decisions to keep up with those changes accordingly. In Trop v. Dulles (1958),
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled “the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment, draws its meaning from the ‘evolving standards of decency’ that mark the
progress of a maturing society.” The high court has recently relied on such standard when
deciding against executing the mentally retarded (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002) and lately in
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March, 2005 (Associated Press) in ruling that the death penalty was unconstitutional for
juveniles. In 1989, the Court ruled the other way in making its decision about juveniles and
the ultimate penalty. What has changed? Clearly, societal viewpoints and the U.S. Supreme
Court (due to the vote of Justice Kennedy) have changed the type of person who is ineligible
to receive the ultimate punishment.
The felony murder theory, however, is a complex legal doctrine and a challenge for
the majority of society to understand. Unfortunately, it may be difficult for the pendulum to
swing the other way on this issue. How can society make a decision about an issue in which
they are uninformed and uneducated about?
Retributivists argue that society must give offenders what they deserve, and that in
itself harming them is good. Utilitarians deny that harming offenders is good in itself, but
contend that the good that results from harming them (punishment) is positive in the form
of crime prevention, mainly deterrence, and that this good outweighs the harm done to the
defendant (Golash, 2005). In the purest sense of utility, punishment must never outweigh
the benefit of the greater good and, in fact, it must better society in some way—a utility or
be of some use.
The concept of felony murder is an artificial concept in the strictest sense, arguably,
appealing more to emotion than to logic. Understandably, the appeal is to the sentiment that
a criminal should be punished for a death that occurred during the commission of a crime he
committed even if the death is unintentional, accidental, or committed by another person.
After all, but for the commission of the crime the death would not have occurred. There is
not much debate whether a person should be punished for such a crime, and there is little
question that a defendant should be punished more harshly than for the underlying felony
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alone. The severity of the punishment given under such circumstances is the unanswered
question.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In reviewing and analyzing many criminal statutes for first-degree murder and firstdegree felony murder, it is difficult to unite the two disparate crimes into essentially one
provision for murder. For instance, in all first-degree murder statutes there is some form of
culpability language, which states that an individual must kill “willfully” with “purpose” and
“knowledge” or that one must “intentionally” kill with a “deliberate” and/or “premeditated”
design. In the next portion of the statute, there is the phrase, “or in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate” along with a list of qualifying felonies that apply to first-degree felony
murder if a killing takes place. To coalesce felony murder with first-degree, premeditated
murder seems incongruent with the basic premise of the criminal law. Specifically, attaching
the same level of blameworthiness to each individual offender who commits each crime. It is
the opinion of this research that the theory for allowing felony murder to qualify for firstdegree premeditated murder is tenuous at best.
Furthermore, it is difficult to understand how the felony-murder rule can be viewed
as such a dichotomous issue among legal professionals. Of course prosecutors favor the rule
because it absolves them of having to prove specific intent for the murder in which they are
seeking conviction.
Statutes and case law support the research question that the felony-murder rule is
available at the highest degree in most jurisdictions. Furthermore, the research question that
a death sentence is available for felony murder in a large majority of jurisdictions that utilize
the death penalty was also verified. The non-triggerman question was partially supported in
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that an accomplice can be convicted of felony murder and eligible for a death sentence
under certain culpability situations and circumstances deemed by the courts.
Recommendations for future research include finding additional support that felony
murder convictions are increasing in the nation compared to other types of murder
convictions. Although Myers’s study (1997) confirmed this to some degree, her research was
limited to a small number of cases specific to Alameda County, California. Future research
should seek to further support this hypothesis, as it is beyond the scope of this work.
In addition, analyzing sentencing data for felony murder is also suggested to
determine whether sentences under the theory of felony murder are excessive compared to
other types of killings. Does a person convicted of the crime of felony murder deserve the
same punishment as a person convicted of unadulterated first-degree murder? These are
some of the questions this research leaves unanswered.
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Jurisdiction

Identification of Felony Murder

Statutes That Identify Felony Murder

Alabama

Murder

Alabama Criminal Code § 13A-6-2 (a) (3)

Alaska

Second Degree Murder

Alaska Statutes § 11.41.110 (a) (3)

First Degree Murder

Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1105, A, 2

Capital Murder/First Degree Murder

Arkansas Crim Code §§ 5-10-101 (a) (1) and 5-10-102 (a) (1)

California

First/Second Degree Murder

California Penal Code §189

Colorado

First Degree Murder

Colorado Criminal Code § 18-3-102 (b)

Connecticut

Felony Murder

Connecticut Penal Code Chap 952 § 53a-54c

Arizona
Arkansas

(1)

(2)

Delaware

First /Second Degree Murder

Delaware Crim Code Title 11 §§ 636 (a) (2) and 635 (2)

Dist of Columbia

First Degree Murder

D.C. Code Title 22 § 22-2101 [formerly 22-2401]

Florida

First/Second/Third Degree Murder

FL Statutes §§§ 782.04 (1) (a), 2; 782.04 (3); and 782.04 (4)

Georgia

Murder/Involuntary Manslaughter

Criminal Code of Georgia §§ 16-5-1 and 16-5-3

Hawaii

Abolished

Hawaii Revised Statutes § 707-701

Idaho

First Degree Murder

Idaho Statutes Chap 40 § 18-4003 (d)

Illinois

First Degree Murder

Illinois Compiled Statutes Chap 720 § 5/9-1 (a) (3)

Indiana

Murder/Involuntary Manslaughter

Inidana Code §§ 35-42-1-1 (2), and IC 35-42-1-4

Iowa

First Degree Murder/Involuntary Manslaughter

Iowa Code §§ 707.2, 2 and 707.5

Kansas

First Degree Murder

KSA Article 34 § 21-3401 (b)

Kentucky

Abolished

See Kentucky Penal Code § 507.020

(3)

Louisiana

First /Second Degree Murder/Manslaughter

LA RS §§§ 14:30 A (1), 14:30.1 A (2), and 14:31 A (2) (a)

Maine

Felony Murder

Main Criminal CodeTitle 17-A Chap 9 §202, 1
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Jurisdiction

Identification of Felony Murder

Statutes That Identify Felony Murder

Maryland

First Degree Murder

Maryland Criminal Law § 2-201 (a) (4)

Massachusetts

First Degree Murder

Gen Laws of Massachusetts § 265 Sec 1

Michigan

Abolished (4)

See Michigan Penal Code § 750.316 (1) (b)

(5)

(6)

Minnesota

First /Second

/Third Degree Murder

Minn Crim Code §§§ 609.185 (a) (3), 609.19 and 609.195 (a)

Mississippi

Capital Murder, Murder, and Manslaughter

Miss Code §§§ 97-3-19 (2) (e-f), 97-3-19 (1) (c), and 97-3-27

Missouri

Second Degree Murder

Missouri Revised Statutes § 565.021(2)

Montana

Deliberate Homicide

Montana Criminal Code § 45-5-102 (1) (b)

Nebraska

First Degree Murder/Manslaughter

Nebraska Criminal Code §§ 28-303 (2) and 28-305

Nevada

First Degree Murder/Involuntary Manslaughter

Nevada Revised Statutes §§ 200.030, 1 (b) and 200.070

New Hampshire

First (7)/Second Degree Murder

NH Criminal Code §§ 630:1-a (b) (1-3) and 630:1-b (b)

New Jersey

Murder

NJ Code of Criminal Justice § 2C:11-3 (3)

New Mexico

First Degree Murder/Involuntary Manslaughter

NM Statutes Annotated 1978 §§ 30-2-1, A (2) and 30-2-3, B

New York

First/Second Degree Murder

NY Penal Law §§ 125.27, 1 (a) (vii) and 125.25, 3

North Carolina

First/Second Degree Murder

NC General Statutes Article 6 § 14-17

North Dakota

Murder

ND Criminal Code § 12.1-16-01, 1, c

Ohio

Aggravated Murder (8)/Murder/Involuntary Manslaughter

Ohio Revised Code §§§ 2903.01 (B), 2903.02 (C), and 2903.04 (B)

Oklahoma

First/Second Degree Murder

Penal Code of Oklahoma §§ 21-701.7.B and 21-701.8.2

Oregon

Murder

Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.115 (b)

Pennsylvania

Second Degree Murder

Penn Crimes Code § 2502 (b)

Rhode Island

First Degree Murder

Rhode Island Criminal Offenses § 11-23-1
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Jurisdiction

Identification of Felony Murder

Statutes That Identify Felony Murder

South Carolina (9)

Murder

SC Code of Laws Chap 3 Article 1 § 16-3-5

South Dakota

First/Second Degree Murder

SD Codified Laws §§ 22-16-4 and 22-16-9

Tennessee

First/Second Degree Murder

Tenn Code §§ 39-13-302 (a) (2) and 39-13-210 (a) (2)

Texas

Murder

Texas Penal Code § 19.02 (b) (3)
(10)

Utah

Aggravated Murder

/Murder

Utah Criminal Code §§ 76-5-202 (1) (d) and 76-5-203 (2) (d) (ii)

Vermont

First Degree Murder

Vermont Statutes Annotated § 2301

Virginia

Capital (11)/First/Second Degree Murder

Code of Virginia §§§ 18.2-31, 18.2-32, and 18.2-33

Washington

First/Second Degree Murder

RCW 9A §§ 32.030 (1) (c) and 32.050 (1) (b)

West Virginia

First Degree Murder

West Virginia Code § 61-2-1

Wisconsin

Felony Murder

Wisconsin Criminal Code § 940.03

Wyoming

First Degree Murder

Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982 § 6-2-101 (a)

United States

First Degree Murder

US Code Title 18 Chap 51 § 1111 (a)

(1) Felony must be committed under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life for both capital and first-degree murder.
(2) Must recklessly cause death for first-degree felony murder.
(3) Requires specific intent for first-degree felony murder.
(4) Judicially abrogated felony murder rule in 1980, but the statute still remains law.
(5) Requires that the defendant cause the death with intent to effect the death of another to qualify for first-degree felony murder.
(6) Separates second-degree murder into intentional and unintentional murder.
(7) Requires a knowing mental state in order to be convicted of first-degree murder.
(8) Requires that the defendant act purposely in killing during the felony to qualify for aggravated murder.
(9) Provides for underlying felonies in listing of aggravators.
(10) Requires an intentional and knowing mental state while engaged in a felony to be death eligible.
(11) Requires a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing while in the commission of a felony to qualify for capital murder.
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Burglary
Escape
Kidnapping
Rape

Alabama
x
x
x
x
x

Alaska*
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Arizona
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Arkansas
x
x
x
x
x

California
x
x
x
x

Colorado
x
x

Connecticut

Delaware

D.C.
x

Florida
x

Idaho

Indiana
x

x
x

x

Iowa

Kansas
x
x

Louisiana
x
x

Maine
x

Maryland
x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x

x

x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x
x
x

x

x
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x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
7

x
x
x
4

x

x

x

x

x
x

Georgia

x

x

x

Illinois
x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

Treason

Terrorism

Sodomy

Resisting Arrest

Murder of Another Human Being

Mayhem

Larceny or Theft

Felony (any type)
Felony (forcible/with threat or
dangerous weapon)
Felony Other Than Second-Degree
Murder/Manslaughter

Elder/Disabled Adult Abuse

Drive-by Shooting/Into Building or
Vehicle
Drug Trafficking

Crime Punishable by Death or Life

Controlled Substance Felony

Carjacking

Child Abuse/Cruelty to Children

Bomb or Destructive Device
(throwing/placing/discharging)

Aggravated Assault

Aircraft/Vehicle Piracy

Home-Invasion Robbery

Robbery

Sexual Offenses with a Child

Other Sexual Offenses

Sexual Assault

Forcible Rape

Arson

Jurisdiction

x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x

x
x

x

Total
Core
Felonies
by State
7

8

x
11

x
9

12

4

9

17
1

9
1

8

3

11
9

6

11

South Carolina
Minnesota
x
x

Mississippi
x
x

Montana
x
x

Nebraska
x
x

Nevada
x
x

New Hampshire
x
x

New Jersey
x
x
x

x

x

x

New York
x
x

North Carolina
x
x

North Dakota
x
x
x
x

Ohio
x
x
x
x

Oklahoma
x
x
x
x

Oregon
x
x
x
x

Pennsylvania*
x
x
x
x

Rhode Island
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x
x

x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x

x
x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x
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x

Massachusetts

x

x

Missouri*

New Mexico

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

Treason

Terrorism

Sodomy

Resisting Arrest

Murder of Another Human Being

Mayhem

Larceny or Theft

Felony (any type)
Felony (forcible/with threat or
dangerous weapon)
Felony Other Than Second-Degree
Murder/Manslaughter

Elder/Disabled Adult Abuse

Drive-by Shooting/Into Building or
Vehicle
Drug Trafficking

Crime Punishable by Death or Life

Controlled Substance Felony

Carjacking

Child Abuse/Cruelty to Children

Bomb or Destructive Device
(throwing/placing/discharging)

Aggravated Assault

Aircraft/Vehicle Piracy

Home-Invasion Robbery

Robbery

Sexual Offenses with a Child

Other Sexual Offenses

Sexual Assault

Forcible Rape

Rape

Kidnapping

Escape

Burglary

Arson

Jurisdiction
Total
Core
Felonies
by State

x
2

x
10

x
9

x
1

x
8

x
6

x
10
4

x
8

x
1

x
7

x
7

x
9

7

11
8

6

9

6

Arson
Burglary

Kidnapping
Rape

South Dakota
x
x
x
x
x

Tennessee
x
x
x
x
x

Utah
x
x

Vermont
x
x

Virginia
x
x

Washington
x
x

West Virginia
x
x

Wisconsin
x
x

Wyoming
x
x

United States
Felony Total
Percentage
x

x

x
x

x

x

x
x
x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
39 40 25 37 20 3 20
9
12 40 3 4 2
80% 82% 51% 76% 41% 6% 41% 18% 24% 82% 6% 8% 4%
x

x

x

6
12%

x

*Second-degree felony murder only
The underlying felonies listed are derived from each jurisdiction's highest degree of felony murder.
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x

x
x

Texas
x
x

x

15
6
12
1
5
4 2 4
5
31% 12% 24% 2% 10% 8% 4% 8% 10%
2
4%

x

x

x

Treason

Terrorism

Sodomy

Resisting Arrest

Murder of Another Human Being

Mayhem

Larceny or Theft

Felony (any type)
Felony (forcible/with threat or
dangerous weapon)
Felony Other Than Second-Degree
Murder/Manslaughter

Elder/Disabled Adult Abuse

Drive-by Shooting/Into Building or
Vehicle
Drug Trafficking

Crime Punishable by Death or Life

Controlled Substance Felony

Carjacking

Child Abuse/Cruelty to Children

Bomb or Destructive Device
(throwing/placing/discharging)

Aggravated Assault

Aircraft/Vehicle Piracy

Home-Invasion Robbery

Robbery

Sexual Offenses with a Child

Other Sexual Offenses

Sexual Assault

Forcible Rape

Escape

Jurisdiction

x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x
x
x

x
x
3 4 3 4
6
10 4
6% 8% 6% 8% 12% 20% 8%

Total
Core
Felonies
by State
6

10
2

12
5

6

5

7

5

8

8
N/A
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Culpability Situations and Circumstances

Jurisdiction

Highest Degree
of Felony Murder

Circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life
and in the course of and furtherance or immediate flight

Arkansas

Capital Murder

Recklessly cause death while engaged in the commission of or
attempt to commit or flight after committing

Delaware

First Degree Murder

Specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm while engaged
in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate

Louisiana

First Degree Murder

Causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death
while committing or attempting to commit

Minnesota

First Degree Murder

Knowingly causes the death of another while engaged in
the commission of or while attempting to commit

New Hampshire

First Degree Murder

Purposely cause death while committing or attempting to
commit or while fleeing immediately after

Ohio

Aggravated Murder

Intentionally or knowingly causes death while engaged in
commission or attempt to commit, or in immediate flight

Utah

Aggravated Murder

Willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing during the commission
of or attempt to commit

Virginia

First Degree Murder

Illinois
Indiana
Massachusetts
Montana
New Mexico
Oklahoma
West Virginia
Wisconsin

First Degree Murder
Murder
First Degree Murder
Deliberate Homicide
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
Felony Murder

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Colorado
Connecticut
Kansas
Maine
Missouri
North Dakota
Oregon
Texas
Washington

Murder
Second Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
Felony Murder
First Degree Murder
Felony Murder
Second Degree Murder
Murder
Murder
Murder
First Degree Murder

While committing or attempting to commit

Commits or attempts to commit; in the course of and in
furtherance of or in immediate flight therefrom
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Culpability Situations and Circumstances

Jurisdiction

Highest Degree
of Felony Murder

New Jersey

Murder

New York

First Degree Murder

California
Dist of Columbia
Florida
Idaho
Maryland
Nebraska
Nevada
North Carolina
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Tennessee
United States
Vermont
Wyoming

Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder
First Degree Murder

South Carolina

Murder

Georgia

Murder

Iowa
Mississippi
Pennsylvania

First Degree Murder
Capital Murder
Second Degree Murder

Engaged in commission of or attempt to commit or flight
after committing or attempting to commit

Committing or attempting to commit or in furtherance of

In perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate

Murder aggravated to felony murder

Commits the offense

While participating/engaged in the commission of

The delineated situations and circumstances are associated with the highest degree of felony murder in each jurisdiction.
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